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ABSTRACT
 Language is a multimodal experience that flows through vocalizations, gestures, 
facial expressions and even textual or symbolic mediums.  New studies on captive apes 
shows that they employ multimodal communication more often than not, yet this 
methodology has not been applied to apes reared in language-rich environments, either with 
American Sign Language or printed symbols.  Using archived video data of spontaneous 
communicative interactions (n= 336) between a language enculturated bonobo (Pan 
paniscus), Kanzi, and human caretakers, I catalogue utterances and analyze them for 
lexigram (printed symbols) and manual gesture combinations.  Gestures are catalogued 
within Kendon’s continuum (2004) in the categories of beats, points, and iconics.  Kanzi was 
shown to produce a significantly larger mean utterance length (1.46 symbols per utterance) 
than the 1.15 posited by Clive Wynne (2001).  Kanzi also produced significantly longer mean 
utterances when gestures were included in the analysis (1.85 symbols per utterance).  Kanzi 
did not significantly alter his production in conditions of prompted versus spontaneous 
utterances, which suggests no Clever Hans or performance aspect to his productions.  
However, Kanzi was shown to increase his utterance length depending on his number of 
repetitions, suggesting he employs the Gricean Maxim of Quantity (1975) in his 
communications.  Further discussion focuses on how Kanzi’s abilities are often 
misrepresented through some individual’s adherence to the longstanding metaphysical divide 
between humans and animals.
vii
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
 Language is a multimodal experience that flows through vocalizations, gestures, 
facial expressions and even textual or symbolic mediums.  How much of this multi-modal 
facility is uniquely human has long been questioned.  Work by Sue Savage-Rumbaugh and 
her colleagues with a family of language enculturated bonobos (Pan paniscus) has attempted 
to probe the limits of human uniqueness with regards to language competence for the past 30 
years (Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1986; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 1989; Savage-Rumbaugh et 
al. 2000; Savage-Rumbaugh et al. 2005).  Despite the abilities displayed by Kanzi, the most 
well-represented member of this bonobo family in publications, there is still much 
skepticism.  Clive Wynne’s work (2001; 2004) accounts for a significant amount of the 
prevailing skepticism.  He proposes, for example, that Kanzi uses only 1.15 symbols per 
utterance (Wynne, 2001).  However, Wynne (2001) does not take into account the 
multimodal nature of language, including gestures, and his data comes secondhand from a 
single study performed when Kanzi was still a juvenile (Rumbaugh et al., 1986).  As such, I 
propose to analyze a random sample of archived video of spontaneous interactions by Kanzi 
with human caretakers to collect communicative events, which I will examine regarding both 
gesture and lexigram symbol use.  I hypothesize that such a multimodal analysis will yield a 
significantly higher mean utterance length than that proposed by Wynne (2001; 2004).
 Gestures play an integral role in the language of human adults.  They can be found 
across all cultures in connection with speech regardless of the language spoken (Corballis, 
2002).  While they vary in their form and temporal placement in association with differing 
styles and/or formations of speech, they appear to be a constant component of human 
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communication (Goldin-Meadow, 2003).  They accompany anywhere from 80-90% of all 
speech in English speaking adults (Mayberry and Nicoladis, 2000).  Humans use gestures 
even when the intended recipient is unable to see them, such as during phone conversations 
and when speaking to blind individuals (Goldin-Meadow, 2003).  Additionally, congenitally 
blind individuals who have never seen gestures employ gestures at the same rate as their 
sighted peers and do so without a change in frequency when knowingly talking to other 
congenitally blind individuals (Iverson and Goldin-Meadow, 2001).  During development, 
gestures appear before speech and their use in conjunction with words appears necessary in 
order to advance to multi-word utterances (Butcher and Goldin-Meadow, 2000).  This multi-
modal communication is thought to be one necessary step in the development of full human 
language capabilities (Iverson and Goldin-Meadow, 2005).
Primate language studies have often focused upon non-verbal languages such as 
American Sign Language (ASL) and pictographic symbol systems (e.g., lexigrams) in order 
to get around the difficulties that earlier researchers encountered in trying to teach apes to 
speak vocally (Hayes and Hayes, 1951).  Due to the differences in vocal anatomy between 
Homo sapiens and nonhuman great apes, gluttogonic studies were generally considered 
unsuccessful (Gardner and Gardner, 1969).  Non-verbal ape language studies have been met 
with mixed reviews, however.  Each species of great ape has shown a propensity for using 
human language to varying degrees.  The general sense is that while ape language studies are 
interesting, they do not show that apes are capable of full human language (Cohen, 2010).
Often, critiques of ape language studies limit their analyses to single modalities of 
productive communication, such as sign or lexigram production.  Wynne notes of Kanzi, “the 
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vast majority of Kanzi’s utterances (94 percent) are just a single sign (his utterances average 
1.15 signs)” (2004: 126).  Wynne (2004) employs Kanzi’s utterance length to suggest that he 
does not have full human language skills, such as grammar, which can only be displayed in 
multi-word utterances.  Such a critique is significant in that Wynne’s analysis has been 
published in popular media and introductory textbooks, whereby it can reach a wide and 
fairly naive audience.  The potential is there for him to significantly impact common 
perception of ape language studies at a large scale.  Additionally, he provides a set 
quantitative value for Kanzi’s productive competence that is not seen in other publications.  
Yet, Wynne’s work is problematic.  His critique of Kanzi’s utterances is based off data from a 
single paper, published when Kanzi was still a juvenile (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1986).  
Such a critique is additionally incomplete in that it only considers one modality of productive 
communication.  As noted above, human language is a multimodal experience.  Therefore, in 
order to get a better grasp of what Kanzi’s productive competence is, one should look 
towards a multimodal analysis of his utterances to assess whether critiques such as those 
raised by Wynne are justified.  Slocombe et al. (2011) advocate for a multimodal approach in 
all primate communication studies, “By examining communicative signals in concert we can 
both avoid methodological discontinuities as well as better understand...language as part of a 
multimodal system”  (2011: 1).  
Objectives and hypotheses
  I test the hypothesis that Kanzi uses gestures to augment lexigram utterances, as 
bridges between lexigrams or as supplemental signs to initiate and/or finish a statement, to 
facilitate multi-word statements beyond the mean length determined by Wynne.  Kanzi’s 
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mean length of utterance, in this multimodal model, will be significantly higher than the 
mean estimated by Wynne (2001; 2004) of 1.15 symbols per utterance.  My null hypothesis is 
that Kanzi’s gesture use will not increase the mean length of utterance beyond that calculated 
by Wynne (2001; 2004).  My specific aims are as follows:
•  Determine whether Kanzi’s use of multiple modalities, especially gesture, to facilitate 
the production of multi-word utterances.  One of the most consistent critiques of Kanzi’s 
language abilities is the limited length of his lexigram utterances (Wynne, 2001; 2004).  
The assumption is that true language facilitates multi-word utterances using syntactical and 
grammatical rules and that if apes do not produce such multi-word, rule bounded 
utterances, then they must not have a true understanding of grammar.  They therefore do 
not possess full language capabilities.  However, such critiques are limited by their single 
communicative modality focus.  A holistic analysis of spontaneous conversations between 
Kanzi and his caretakers will illuminate whether or not he combines gestures and lexigrams 
in a consistent manner.
•  Determine that Kanzi employs different gesture types, ranging from iconics to 
points to beats, in conjunction with lexigram use.  An increased understanding of 
gesture’s role in bridging lexigram utterances and expanding upon their communicative 
ability could be further complimented by a rough knowledge of which types of gestures 
(beat, iconic, or pointing) are used.  This information may also inform our 
understandings of Kanzi’s gestural competencies and/or proclivities, while placing 
them within a consistent coding scheme with human gesture studies, allowing for future 
comparative studies.
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• Code and quantify the manual gestures used by Kanzi in conjunction with lexigram 
utterances.  Often, a lack of consistent coding schemes for manual gestures has created 
unnecessary roadblocks in the understanding of gestures as a symbolic medium.  This is 
especially true in the case of dealing with apes and pre-linguistic children, where multiple 
coding schemes have been employed (Kendon, 2004).  This coding will be beneficial to the 
future study of gestures in the bonobos and will provide a base of knowledge and 
methodology from which to continue future investigations (see: Methods).
• Identify gestures according to the categories of points, beats, and iconics as 
defined by Kendon (2004) and McNeil (1992).  I will identify occurrences of 
lexigram use and then code the manual gestures for points, beat and iconic gestures.  
Though the statistical analysis will focus on gestures generally, they will be further 
categorized into the three types mentioned (see: Methods).  It would be beneficial to 
know if certain types of gesture occurred either infrequently to the point of being 
statistically insignificant or so often that they dominate the interaction. 
• Attach contextual data to coding in order to leave the opportunity open for further 
multivariate statistical analysis.  Kanzi may produce longer utterances in certain 
conditions, such as spontaneous utterances versus utterances that answer caretaker 
prompting.  The location in which he’s communicating or the identity of his present 
companions may also bear some effect upon his expressiveness.  A multivariate analysis of 
Kanzi repetitions would also be highly productive to determine if he employs certain 
methods of optimal efficiency in his utterances in line with the Gricean Maxim of quantity.
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 Background and significance
 Language has long been thought to be the exclusive ability of humanity (Lurz, 2009).  
However, formal investigations into ape language have been attempting to question this long-
held assumption since the early Twentieth Century.  Unfortunately, skepticism and fear of 
anthropomorphism have made acceptance of ape language abilities, no matter how 
objectively and rigorously studied, to be extremely slow (Wynne, 2004).  I contend that 
Kanzi’s language abilities, extensive as they are, have often been under-documented by a 
unimodal focus.  When Wynne (2001; 2004) suggests that Kanzi uses only 1.15 symbols per 
utterance (setting aside all the issues with his limited sample), he neglects to address the 
other modalities of symbolic communication that Kanzi may be employing simultaneously.
The Lexigram keyboard system was originally created by a team led by Duane 
Rumbaugh and Ernst von Glasersfeld in 1971 for work with a chimpanzee named Lana (see: 
Background).  They have since been used in a number of ape language studies.  Lexigrams 
are square pictographs that are associated with a single English word, placed on an 8x16 grid 
on three separate ‘panels’.  They can be displayed on any surface, with the most common 
being paper printouts and computer touchscreens.
 The keyboard has its limitations when it comes to expressive ability as it is composed 
of a finite lexicon.  As such, to interpret Kanzi’s linguistic ability based solely on his 
keyboard production is to inherently limit him from the onset.  Little has been made of the 
keyboard’s expressive deficiencies.  However, an analysis of how Kanzi augments the finite 
lexicon of his lexigram keyboard with other modalities of communication could provide an 
expanded understanding of his true linguistic ability in seeing how he speaks in spite of the 
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lexigrams.  The literature concerned with human gestures, especially when used in place of 
other forms of communication could grant significant insight in furthering ape language 
research.
 A multimodal analysis of Kanzi’s abilities is necessary and would be highly beneficial 
to studies of language and gestures in apes.  Just as they are employed by humans, gestures 
may be providing a bridge between symbols or may be accessing meanings that are not 
readily available to Kanzi via the finite printed symbol lexicon.  This would indicate that 
apes have the capacity to use gestures as a medium of communication when other modalities 
are ineffectual or impractical.  In situations in which apes do not have a reliable modality that 
they can use to make their desires known, unlike the lexigrams for Kanzi, they may employ 
gestures.  Numerous studies of ape gestures in captivity suggest that they are attempting to 
use gestures rarely seen in wild contexts to mediate inter-species communication (or 
manipulation) with human caretakers (Leavens et al., 2005; Leavens et al., 2010; Tomasello, 
2006; Slocombe et al., 2011; Pika, 2008).
 Renewed interest into the potential gestural origins of language further reinforces the 
need for further study of ape gestures within a multimodal model (Slocombe et al., 2011).  
Gestural language origin theories propose that gestures arose before other modalities based 
on the fact that they are present in both humans and nonhuman apes and can arise without the 
human brain evolving first (Hewes, 1992).  It is hypothesized that use of communicative 
gestures increased language oriented selection until humans developed vocal speech (Hewes, 
1992).  If Kanzi uses less reinforced gestures to augment his heavily encouraged lexigram 
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use, it would suggest that there is some evolutionary basis for gestures use that existed within 
our last common ancestor. 
 If Kanzi uses gestures as hypothesized in this study, it could support gestural origin 
theories of language while also laying the groundwork for further study into the neurological 
basis of gesture use in great apes.  Arbib et al. (2008) have focused largely on the mirror 
neuron system and its role in gesture production and hypothesize that these two systems 
worked to foster vocal speech in humans, evolutionarily, rather than human speech 
developing from nonhuman primate vocalizations.  Additionally, this would be an example of 
the embodied nature of culture and cognition, as originally posited by Andy Clark (1997), 
that shows that cognition and biology are inextricably linked as opposed to the mental 
dualism that is often present in cognitive studies.  For Clark, the ‘mind’ is distributed 
throughout the body, brain, and environment, eschewing the biological determinism that is 
often used to exclude apes from human level intelligence.
 Fields et al. (2008) explain the embodied culture of Kanzi and the other language 
enculturated bonobos as an essential aspect of their enculturation.  They note that their 
unlimited interactions incorporate both gestures and uses of words (Fields et al. 2008: 171).  
The embodied reality of Kanzi’s life has also been analyzed by independent researchers 
detached from his daily life and care (Cowley and Spurrett, 2002).  They believe Kanzi’s 
abilities bolster the case for embodied cognition broadly while ultimately supporting an 
anthropocentric position on language (Cowley and Spurrett, 2002).  They note that, “Kanzi 
may use his body, the physical environment and human scaffolding to exploit lexigrams and 
utterances [without possessing human levels of language]” (Cowley and Spurrett, 2002: 305). 
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 While Cowley and Spurrett (2002) do not think that this necessitates that Kanzi is 
using lexigrams symbolically in the same way that humans use language, they do provide a 
point at which further discussion could yield promising insights.  Concepts of embodied 
cognition need not be incompatible with Kanzi’s rigorously demonstrated symbolic 
competence.  Cowley and Spurrett (2002) also acknowledge that Kanzi’s actions are 
motivated as much by what he has (lexigrams and culture) as what he doesn’t (an infinite 
lexigram lexicon).  Given these limitations, he makes the most of what is available within his 
cultural framework.  This concept of embodiment can also provide a bridge to other studies 
of embodied culture, as touched on by Tim Ingold (2008).
This study also has the potential to reorient theoretical perspectives in cultural 
anthropology.  Both apes and gestures have existed at the boundaries of specific cultural 
categories that often have direct influence upon western definitions of humanity.  While most 
cultural anthropologists are content to study humanity as if it were a discrete group with set 
boundaries, we have yet to experimentally define those limits.  As such, we often fall into old 
biases and practices of othering that have plagued anthropology since its inception.  The 
boundary has simply moved from primitives to primates.  Apes are considered to be like, but 
ultimately less than humans in analogously contradictory terms.  Kanzi, specifically, 
traverses categorical distinctions of language, humanity, and animal through his upbringing 
and abilities.  So in thinking about Kanzi, we are also thinking about humanity and how we 
conceive of it.  Engaging with Kanzi and his abilities, therefore, allows us to further 
comment on the current conceptions of humanity and its connection to, or disconnection 
from, nonhuman animals.
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
 I, the author, Kanzi, the subject, and all the background studies of Kanzi and his 
abilities are all situated within a western cultural and scientific framework.  As such, it is this 
history that is most relevant to the current investigation.  No doubt, other cultures beyond 
those derived of the Greco-Roman tradition have investigated these universal aspects of 
human behavior, but they are not the focus herein.  I acknowledge that this lack of cross-
cultural historical perspective is unfortunate but do not believe it to be detrimental to the 
current study.  The more contemporary studies of human language and gesture offer cross-
cultural, bilingual, and international perspectives on the current issues and address some of 
the cultural deficiencies of the early historical material regarding conceptions of human 
gesture and language.
 Throughout the following literature review, there is a parallel history at work.  
Gestures, apes, and indigenous peoples are all encountered and thought about in similar 
terms and within the same philosophical confines throughout the past two millennia.  At 
times, conceptions of all three, despite their obvious categorical and practical differences, 
mirror one another.  As exposure to apes and indigenous peoples increases, contact forces 
western peoples to address not only these new beings, but also their own conceptions of 
themselves.  Often these encounters have dire consequences as traditional self-conceptions 
are tested and, sometimes, violently defended.
Ancient References to Gestures
 The study of human gestures has been of interest to western cultures since at least the 
time of the ancient Greeks. Thinkers such as Aristotle discussed gesture in terms of how they 
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commonly accompanied speech, specifically in terms of professional orators.  However, 
these studies were as much about designating proper orator behavior as about discovering 
gestures.  In fact, Aristotle supposedly discouraged gestures or other bodily movements 
during oration because he believed they distracted from the actual facts and reason being 
expressed through speech (Kendon, 2004).
 The Romans carried these ideas of gesture forward through the works of Cicero and 
Marcus Fabius Quintilianus.  Cicero differed from Aristotle in that he believed gestures to be 
worthy of cultivation and employment in speaking.  Important to Cicero, however, was the 
condition that gestures be dignified and not become the overdone miming of actors (Dutsch, 
2002).  Gesture was not expected to, nor was it proper to, express internal thoughts.  Rather, 
gesture served to emphasize thoughts expressed in speech.  For Cicero, gestures provided 
force and emotion to verbal ideas.
 Quintilianus’s work of the First Century C.E. is important in that it heavily influenced 
later thinkers during the Renaissance through to the 17th Century and beyond.  In many ways, 
his ideas can still be seen as a base for some modern conceptions of gestures.  His work, like 
others of the time, focused on oration and proper delivery of rhetoric.  He provided a large, at 
that time, catalog of eighteen acceptable gestures for use in oration.  Drawing from Cicero 
more so than Aristotle, he divided rhetorical delivery into the two categories of ‘voice’ and 
‘movement’ with each capable of cultivation and refinement (Quintilianus, 1922).  However, 
these categories are not equivalent in that speech is the primary in almost every way with 
gesture a distant secondary aspect of communication.  For Quintilianus, gesture is molded to 
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speech and acts only to support it (Quintilianus, 1922).  Gesture can emphasize emotions or 
forces but not provide its own symbolic meanings under this framework.
 In this, Quintilianus is somewhat hypocritical.  He notes that gestures can act like 
their own language; that they can demand, question, and summon among other acts.  
Additionally, he recognizes that despite spoken language differences and 
incomprehensibility, gestures are near universally understood (Quintilianus, 1922).  
Quintilianus, through this seemingly contradictory conceptual dichotomy, expressed one of 
the biggest issues in the study of human gestures.  By placing primary focus and importance 
on verbal language, and making it the only possible expression of symbolic thought, he 
relegated gestures to a subservient role in communication despite their language-like abilities 
and near universality.  
 As shall be seen, throughout history the privileging of vocals over gestures as the only 
truly linguistic medium places gestures in a problematic categorical middle ground that is 
often, if not always, inconsistent and problematic.  This idea also relegates any nonspeaking 
individual, be they human or not, to a similar problematic state.  By making verbal language 
the medium of symbolic thought, it was often questioned whether nonverbal individuals had 
any symbolic mental processes at all.  This conceptualization will be addressed further in the 
discussion section.
Hints of the Earliest Western Ideas on Apes
 References to apes in ancient Greek and Roman texts are sometimes difficult to 
interpret and differentiate from myth.  There is some debate as to how much these cultures 
knew about other primates.  Both Greek and Roman territories bordered great ape habitat 
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and, given the extensive trade networks and high demand for exotic wildlife, primates must 
have been observed in some capacity.  The question is whether they were acknowledged or 
perceived as other animals rather than as semi-divine creatures, like Pan, or monsters.
 It can be confirmed that ancient Greeks definitively knew about the ‘barbary ape’ or 
tailless monkeys, but it is contested whether they were familiar with true apes as we classify 
them today (Meijer, 1999).  Robert Yerkes posits that Galen, a Greek physician from the 
second century C.E., was familiar with apes from his anatomical notes and dissection records 
(1929).  However, many of Galen’s observations, if they are of ape anatomy, were highly 
inaccurate.  As such, it is hard to confirm definitively that he had access to anthropoid apes.  
William McDermott, in The Ape in Antiquity (1938), notes that Aristotle believed humans to 
be the only creature with a wide chest; a contention that any access to or knowledge of the 
apes would have proven highly inaccurate.  
 Given the inaccuracy of most reports, combined with the loose wording and 
descriptive overlap with mythical creatures, it is difficult to determine how much the ancient 
Greeks and Romans knew about apes.  At best, one can find allusions to ape-like creatures.  
True encounters with apes in the European world didn’t occur until around the 15th or 16th 
Century.
Renaissance- 17th Century Studies- Renewed Interest
 During the European dark ages, all scholarship suffered to some extent though 
gestures were still a focus for some.  Rather than study them, most individuals continued in 
the vein of Cicero in discerning the proper social use of gestures during formal speaking 
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(Conley, 1990).  As such, these were less investigations of gestures and more refinements of 
what it meant to engage in proper civilized behavior.  
 Quintilianus’s writings were known only partially until 1416 when a full copy of his 
manuscript was discovered (Kendon, 2004).  With its discovery, there was renewed interest 
in public speaking and the role of persuasive philosophical orators.  Indeed, many religious 
groups and Churches employed some of Quintilianus’s methods into their sermonizing.
 An additional finding of this time with regards to gesture occurred with the 
‘discovery’ of the ‘New World’ in 1492.  As more public officials and scholars investigated 
Quintilianus’s treatise on rhetoric and employing more gesture as a component of oration, 
others had to resort to gesture as a means of first communication with Native American 
groups.  This reinforced the Quintilian idea about gesture being more universal than verbal 
language, drawing some to conceive that a general theory of gesture was possible (Burke, 
1992).  Gesture forcefully emerged as a focus during this century in both theoretical and 
practical terms.
 It is unclear exactly how much the implications of Quintilianus’s conceptions of the 
primacy of verbal language followed, and could be said to impact, recognition of Native 
humanity.  What is not ambiguous are the consequences of the very real and costly denial of 
Native American humanity that occurred for centuries after contact.  The history of this 
process is recounted in David Stannard’s American Holocaust: Columbus and the Conquest 
of the New World (1992).  To give some perspective, questions of the validity of Native 
spoken languages, and implicitly their mental abilities, were still prominent up to the time 
that Franz Boas published a paper dismissing them in “On Alternating Sounds” nearly 400 
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years later (1889).  Though not directly pertinent to this historical overview, the role of verbal 
language in the recognition of personhood and cognition of others, and the costs of its denial, 
will be addressed further in the discussion section.
 Interest in gestures continued to increase into the 16th and 17th centuries when a 
number of scholarly works were devoted entirely to their study as ‘visible language’ instead 
of as an element of proper social behavior.  Two of these works, Giovanni Bonifacio’s The 
Art of Signs... (1616) and John Bulwer’s Chirologia or the Naturall Language of the Hand... 
(1644), dealt with different aspects of nonverbal behavior and had their own specific aims but 
are each still, to a degree, discussed today (Kendon, 2004).
 Bonifacio’s (1616) work begins with an extensive catalogue of as many gestures as he 
can conceive.  This catalogue includes the movements of the face and body as well as the 
hands.  Bonifacio follows Quintilianus’s thought that gesture could be a kind of universal 
language but goes one step further.  Unlike Quintilianus and others before him, Bonifacio 
believed that gesture could be a superior form of expression to spoken language (Knox, 
1990).  This is an extreme departure from the thinking of the past that placed a premium on 
verbals at the expense of gestures.
 With Bonifacio, one can see the emergence of another common philosophical division 
that will continue to underpin debates about gestures, language, and human nature itself for 
centuries onward.  It could be said that earlier thinkers saw gesture as subconscious and 
therefore related to nature, or physis, a highly undesirable and brutish state whereas vocal 
speech was a sign of civilization, humanity, and culture, or nomos.  This idea, that humanity 
has to overcome violent nature/physis with culture/nomos, is represented in a number of 
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thinkers, especially those like Hobbes.  It allowed for an interpretation of Native peoples that 
tended to consider them as more animal-like, more like nature, often as the ‘bloodthirsty 
savage’ stereotype, and therefore open to the same conquest of nomos (European/Colonial 
powers) over physis (Indigenous peoples).  Most early works on gesture could be grouped in 
this school.
 Conversely, thinkers in the style of Rousseau believed that the natural state was more 
pure and innocent than the current state of humanity that had been polluted and fractured by 
civilization.  Under this framework, nature equated with a lost, peaceful, utopian state.  
Physis was not something that was overcome, but lost.  The Rousseau-an conception is 
directly connected to the “noble savage” stereotype of native peoples.  Bonifacio’s emphasis 
on gesture follows this school.   Again, the debate about the nature of human nature, the role 
of civilization, and the divide between the two has a long and complicated history.  This will 
be addressed much more thoroughly in the discussion section.
 Bonifacio believed that gesture was more natural and pure than the artificiality of 
spoken words.  He saw gestures as the most honest means of expression, and therefore, the 
closest to God’s intensions for human communication (Knox, 1996).  It was his hope that, 
through his scholarship, he could help lead humanity back towards this ideal state with a 
more gestural universal language.
 Bulwer was similar to Bonifacio in his belief that gesture was the universal, natural 
language of humanity.  His Chirologia... was the first major work on gestures published in 
English.  Bulwer differed from Bonifacio, however, in that he extensively studied the 
gestures of the deaf in his work as a physician.  In 1649, he even published an alphabet for 
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finger spelling that may be the first recorded instance of a sign language as we conceive of 
them today.  Additionally, Bulwer believed that gesture could be modified and refined in the 
spirit of the writings of Quintilianus.  As such, he blends aspects of the two sides of the 
dichotomy mentioned above.  For Bulwer, gestures emerge from a pristine, natural place and 
are improved with proper cultivation.  In this, he ultimately comes out on the side of more 
Hobbesian school, especially when compared to Bonaficio (Wollock, 2002).
 After Bonaficio and Bulwer, gesture in art emerged as a primary focus (Smart, 1965).  
Painters were encouraged to study the movement of individuals for greater artistic 
authenticity in an effort to make their works more legible.  Actors engaged in thorough 
studies of movement and nonverbal communication to refine their stage presence.  Lastly, 
any individual with aspirations for upward social mobility also came to value training in 
public oratory skills and the accompanying gestures.
 With the 18th Century, the universal character of gesture began to inspire some to 
inquire into natural language origins without a divine component.  During this time, the 
gestural origin theory of language was first formulated.  Earlier thinkers never questioned the 
divine origin of language as proposed through Judeo-Christian theology.  A number of 
thinkers each came up with their own version of the language origin hypotheses including 
Giambattista Vico (1725) and Etienne Bonnot de Condillac (1746) (Kendon, 2004).
 Vico and Condillac’s language origin theories were similar in their overall aims and 
questions but differed in the details.  Each wondered how a sign became meaningful and 
what processes could lead to the coordination of signs among people.  For Vico, signs started 
in the imagination, were translated into mimetic action in a visual medium for transmission 
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to others, and then finally were associated with other mediums such as sounds.  Vico’s 
original humans were thus believed to be mute for a long time until they finally made the 
jump to associating multiple mediums with signs (Danesi, 1996).  
 Condillac, on the other hand, believed that the first form of communication was 
emotional or unconscious cries and their associated movements.  He did not believe humans 
to be mute but just not in control of their verbal and bodily expressions. In this, he avoided 
beginning with a mental representation.  This suggests a fundamental difference in the way 
Vico and Condillac conceived of cognition without language.  Once gestures were developed 
to the point of conscious control, individuals could start to manipulate them into other 
circumstances beyond their emotional stimuli to allow them to take on symbolic meanings in 
multiple contexts.  After gestures were mastered, Condillac proposed that vocals would 
follow and eventually come to replace gestures as a more efficient communicative medium 
(Kendon, 2004).
 In both theories, gesture is the first medium of expression that can be controlled and 
eventually bridges the gap from a void of communication to full spoken language.  Because 
their focus was on origins, neither Condillac nor Vico placed gestures in a category as either 
true language or subservient to verbal language.  As such, rather than judge them as 
something to be overcome or returned to, they see gestures as merely representatives of an 
earlier state that can inform our ideas of language.  Theirs is a historical, rather than 
hierarchical, understanding of the relationship between gesture and verbal language.
 Concurrently at this time there was an increase in studies of sign languages among the 
deaf that further reinforced the idea that gesture could be a universal language.  Denis 
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Diderot (1749), for instance, believed that deaf individuals were unaffected by the numerous 
forms of modern spoken language and could therefore offer an unbiased window on true, 
natural language (a Rousseau-an/Bonaficio like thought) (Diderot, 1916).  While Abbe 
Charles-Michel de l’Epee (1776) focused more on the practical application of sign language 
in a teaching context (Kendon, 2004).  De l’Epee did, however, believe that through a 
gestural language, communication could be improved and universalized beyond the current, 
primarily verbal and highly differentiated, status quo.
Early European Encounters with Apes
 It was during this period of expansion and discovery that the first confirmed records 
of great apes can be found in European writings.  As it was with the ancient Greeks and 
Romans, medieval Europe mostly encountered and studied tailless monkeys, primarily 
macaques (Macaca sylvanus), which were often referred to as apes (Meijer, 1999).  
 In most instances, primates were interpreted as representations of the ‘monstrous 
races’ that occupied a conceptual gray area between human and animal.  Because they were 
observable, somewhat common, and verified by historians, geographers, and biologists, they 
were not considered demons like satyrs or centaurs (Friedman, 2000).  However, because 
they had no obvious Biblical explanation and yet displayed a high degree of similarity to 
humans, they were not considered simply base animals either.  Linnaeus even included six 
categories of monstrous race in his Systema Naturae (1758) under Homo sapiens.
 The earliest depiction of an ape was a drawing of a baboon using a walking stick in a 
1486 book on travels in the Near East (Meijer, 1999).  Similarly inaccurate accounts are 
sporadic for the next century or two despite the growing sample of supposedly accurate 
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observations from explorers, anatomists, and natural historians.  In 1543, enough study had 
been done to show the inaccuracies of Galen’s original descriptions of anatomy, particularly 
concerning the throat of primates as compared to humans (Meijer, 1999).  By 1641, the term 
Orang-utan (Malay for ‘man of the forest’) was used to describe any ape-like creature 
(Corbey, 2005).  Most early depictions of apes put them in anthropomorphic poses, while 
often performing human activities.  An early depiction of a chimpanzee from 1738 pictured 
the female standing upright, sipping tea from a cup (Meijer, 1999).  When Linnaeus reprinted 
this image, he removed the cup, which made it appear that the female was holding her breast, 
further coloring interpretations of apes as lewd brutes (1758).
 Live specimens first made it to Europe around the beginning of the 18th Century.  In 
most instances, these individuals did not live long and their remains were then used for 
anatomical study.  Both chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) and orangutans (Pongo pygmaeus) 
were simultaneously being studied around this time period under the problematic assumption 
that they were variants of one species.  It wasn’t until 1782 that the two were differentiated 
by Petrus Camper after extensive comparison (Meijer, 1999).  Camper, however, encountered 
some classification difficulties in that he also split juvenile and adult orangutans into two 
species.  This was not corrected until after Camper’s death.
 While there was extensive confusion as to how the group the apes, there was also 
vigorous debate about whether they should be classified alongside humans.  This period 
featured numerous attempts by philosophers to define humanity without Biblical 
explanations.  It is no coincidence that, in the time following the ‘discovery’ of the New 
World, Biblical narratives lost some of their unquestioned explanatory power.  It is similarly 
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not a coincidence that, after encountering a whole landmass of people (Native Americans) 
that were not immediately recognized as human or in possession of a soul, that definitions of 
humanity took a central role in most theoretical and academic discourse (Stannard, 1992).  
One of the most common tactics for philosophers was to define humanity not in terms of 
what it was, but in terms of what other beings were not.  As such, humans were often 
positioned as being strictly divided from animals to the point of almost becoming conceptual 
oppositions.  This distinction was often predicated on mental and linguistic terms more so 
than anatomic similarity (Corbey, 2005).  More extensive examples of these philosophies are 
covered in the discussion section.
 In terms of the analyses and study of apes, however, these definitions took on 
practical, rather than theoretical, frameworks.  Through the study of apes, definitions of 
humanity could be tested and compared.  One of the guiding questions of these investigations 
was whether or not apes had the ability to speak.  Up until Camper’s examination of ape 
throat anatomy, it was commonly held, at least since 1623, that apes remained mute in the 
presence of humans in an effort to avoid work and not arouse suspicion (Meijer, 1999).    
Though this viewpoint was countered by Camper’s studies, and widely considered ridiculous, 
it was still popular enough to influence Richard Garner in his investigations of chimpanzee 
vocalizations at the end of the 19th Century (Cohen, 2010).
 A number of philosophers and anatomists, however, were not dissuaded by the 
difference in human and ape vocal anatomies.  Linnaeus believed that apes had their own 
language but that it was incomprehensible to humans because of the way it was produced 
(1758).  In this view, they had human-like comprehension but not production.  Jean-Jacques 
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Rousseau, a prominent thinker who is featured in the discussion section, believed that 
language was not inherent but needed to be mastered through training and that such 
achievement was not beyond the abilities of apes (1750 [1997]).  He also posited that the 
‘Orang-Outang’ was a representation of the perfect, natural state of humanity, still 
uncorrupted by civilization.  Further, Julien Offray de La Mettrie supposed that, despite their 
difficulty producing vocal language, apes could be taught to communicate through the sign 
languages and gestures employed by the deaf (1748 [1994]).  La Mettrie’s observation was 
situated in his rejection of Cartesian dualism and his belief that language was not intrinsically 
unique to humans.  This idea influenced a number of ape language research projects in the 
20th Century and was ahead of his time for his recognition of sign languages as equal to their 
verbal counterparts.
19th Century Studies- Expanded Understanding, Evolution, and Anthropology
 The themes addressed in 18th Century thinking on gesture were further elaborated in 
to the 19th Century.  The sign languages of the deaf or of indigenous peoples were of 
particular interest.  Additionally, a number of theoretical advances, such as the theory of 
natural selection, and new emerging disciplines, like anthropology, brought new insights into 
the study of gesture.  Interestingly, however, despite all the advances, gestures and sign 
languages fell out of academic favor at the end of the century.
 Charles Darwin’s The Origin of Species (1859) and subsequent work reoriented 
conceptions of humanity and biology but seemingly had no direct impact on gesture studies.  
While Darwin discusses language in The Descent of Man (1871), he focuses on and gives 
prominence to its vocal aspects.  In On the Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals 
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(1872), he cites copious examples of nonverbal behavior in many species but deals more with 
facial expressions than gestures.  Darwin’s main contribution to gesture studies may have 
been at a conceptual or theoretical level.  In proposing that humans and animals existed along 
a continuum in their traits and abilities, he laid the conceptual groundwork for cross-species 
comparisons of communication.  While his On the Expressions... flirts with this type of study, 
his focus was more on what he saw as subconscious behaviors, rather than fully intentional 
symbolic communication.
 Unlike Darwin, Edward Tylor directly addressed language and gestures in his theories 
of the evolution of human civilization.  Tylor is widely considered one of the earliest cultural 
anthropologists.  He believed that Culture evolved in a process similar to that proposed by 
Darwin and that, rather than degenerating from the perfect state that God had created them, 
societies progress at different rates through a unlineal progression from simple to complex 
civilization (McGee and Warms, 2004).  An important component of this theoretical 
perspective was the idea that one could gain information about past stages of human 
evolution by looking at ‘survivals’, historic forms that have persisted into the present, often 
in ‘primitive’ societies.
 Tylor’s interest in gestures is more nuanced than Condillac and Vico in that he did not 
see them as necessarily preceding vocal language.  He also did not find them to be inferior to 
verbals and therefore was not strictly historical or hierarchical in his conceptions.  Tylor’s 
idea of gestures aims to illuminate the fundamental nature of language rather than its origins.  
In practical terms, gestures were seen as an easier unit of analysis than spoken words in their 
construction and association with certain meanings.  Within this framework, gestures act 
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analogously to cultural ‘survivals’ and are a tool to understanding the formation of meaning 
that underlies all language (Kendon, 2004).   
 An additional important theoretical aspect of Tylor’s anthropology is the concept of 
the psychic unity of humanity.  Tylor took gesture use around the world as reinforcing this 
idea.  Using information from deaf sign languages and Native American sign languages, he 
determined that gestures occur in the same capacity and style across cultures.  Furthermore, 
Tylor used the example of deaf sign language use to establish that one could be linguistic 
without possessing a verbal language (Tylor, 1865).  This was a departure from many of the 
thinkers of the past who believed rational thought depended on language, with language 
being a verbal event.  Lastly, Tylor posited that gesture and verbals are two components of a 
single system, rather than two individual processes.  Again, this contrasted with previous 
ideas that positioned each communicative medium in complimentary but separate spheres of 
thought.
 Tylor’s position on gesture was partially reinforced by two other thinkers of the time.  
Through a study of Plains Indian sign languages, Garrick Mallery recapitulated Tylor’s view 
that gesture and verbal languages are two aspects of the same process (Mallery, 1972).  
Unfortunately, Mallery also insisted that Native Americans were living examples of 
prehistoric humans and their sign languages, though full language, were emblematic of a less 
evolved human cognitive state (Mallery, 1972).  Mallery’s hierarchical view of human 
evolution is representative of 19th Century Evolutionist thought that Tylor was also a part of.  
While he seemed to have the utmost respect for gesture, the same could not be said of his 
attitude towards the peoples who used it.
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 Mallery was not alone in studying indigenous sign languages.  Numerous studies 
were done with the Australian Aborigines (Howitt, 1890), the island peoples of the Torres 
Straits (Haddon, 1907), and continued interest in Native North America.  However, Mallery’s 
is one of the most prominent and many of the subsequent studies on Native American gesture 
languages were not done by anthropologists or linguists and are of questionable value 
(Kendon, 2004).
 While Mallery offered ethnographic and anthropological support in line with Tylor’s 
concepts of language and gesture, William Wundt, widely considered the father of 
experimental psychology, more endorsed his methodological approach of using gestures as a 
window into language construction (Wundt, 1973).  More so than Tylor, Wundt was 
interested in finding the origin of language through gestures.  Wundt was also especially 
interested in the psychological processes behind gesture use and created a semiotic 
framework for categorizing them.  In concluding his analysis, Wundt agrees with Tylor that 
gestures and speech are part of the same system, but that this system is unique to humans.  
He declares that the gestural communication in animals are not homologous with those of 
humans (Wundt, 1973).  Wundt addresses the issue of animal gestures with the Darwinian 
concept of continuity in mind.  Because he was searching for origins, he wanted to find 
connections between earlier forms of communicative behavior and human language.  
Wundt’s theoretical advances in semiotics continue to be relevant to psychologists studying 
gesture and language today.
 Despite all the advances in the area of gesture study throughout the century, there 
were a number of serious setbacks to the field also.  In Paris in 1865 and London in 1872, 
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groups of prominent linguists and philosophers, respectively, declared that questions of 
language origins were futile and not worthy of consideration (Kendon, 2004).  In concert 
with this shift, numerous anthropologists began, throughout the second half of the century, to 
move away from the hierarchal evolutionist framework of studying other cultures  (McGee 
and Warms, 2004).  Questions of origins were no longer the focus and evolutionary rankings 
of cultures became heavily scrutinized through the work of Franz Boas and his students 
(Boas, 1911).
 The final shift away from the study of gesture occurred in the practical realm of 
education of deaf individuals.  In 1880, a conference of the teachers of deaf individuals 
passed a resolution declaring speech to be superior to gesture (Kendon, 2004).  The 
justification for this move was a group of studies suggesting that the deaf could be taught to 
speak, and that speaking would be better for their integration into human society than 
signing.  It was also believed that combining gestures with speech during instruction 
distracted deaf students from their primary goal of learning to lipread.  The most unfortunate 
result of this resolution was the near universal abandonment of sign language instruction in 
schools for the deaf (Kendon, 2004).
Feral Children, Clever Hans, and Richard Garner
 Another interesting development around this time is the study of instances of ‘feral 
children,’ referred to as Homo ferus in Linnaeus’s Systema Naturae (1758).  Linnaeus noted 
in his description of 16 examples that all resulted from confinement, isolation, or living with 
animals and all shared two major traits.  First, these individuals had a great deal of difficulty 
locomoting bipedally.  Secondly, and most importantly for this overview, they were always 
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near entirely mute and failed to develop or use spoken language beyond a few words.  These 
examples offered an extreme end of the spectrum of human behavioral and cognitive 
flexibility.  
 Monboddo, a prominent thinker of the time, notes that examples of feral children 
should serve as questions to the prevailing definitions of humanity.  With Rousseau, 
Monboddo believed ‘Orang-Outangs’ to be humans without civilization.  In criticizing a 
prominent natural historian and Cartesian, he notes that “[If] Mr Buffon’s Orang-Outang was 
not a man, because he had not learned to speak at the age of two, it is impossible to believe 
that Peter [a feral child], who, at the age of seventy....has learned to articulate but a few 
words, is a man” (Monboddo,1779-1799: 367).
 In Lucien Malson’s overview of so-called ‘wolf children’, he notes that there were 53 
recorded instances of feral children from the 14th Century to 1960 (1972).  Malson focuses 
primarily on several well-documented cases including Victor of Aveyron (1799).  In 
accordance with Linnaeus’s observations, Victor preferred to locomote quadrupedally and did 
not develop language in his life.  He was studied to test the Enlightenment assumptions that 
human empathy and language were universal and inherent in all from birth.  Victor’s abilities 
challenged this perception of humanity.
 In the early 20th Century, the discovery of Kamala (eight years old) and Amala (2 
years old) in a wolves’ den in Midnapore was highly publicized.  It was believed that their 
survival was due to assistance from a wolf.  Their discovery and upbringing was recorded by 
J.A.L. Singh, a local reverend, who tried to bring them into human civilization.  
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Unfortunately, Amala died shortly after her discovery and by the age of 12, Kamala was said 
to have the cognitive abilities of a two year old (Squires, 1927).
 In each case, these children challenged ideas about innate human abilities.  They also 
served as examples of the power of human acculturation and socialization in the development 
of language.  Though none of the examples could master much of spoken language, they 
were said to grunt and employ gestures.  Frequently, these stories guided and inspired 
research into human language and gesture use and beyond that spurred some of the earliest 
ape language and co-rearing studies.  Feral children offered the chance to see what happened 
when a human was removed from their early developmental context, something that has 
almost universally been an ethically unacceptable methodology.  Because instances of feral 
children were rare, investigators such as the Kelloggs attempted the inversion of raising a 
chimpanzee in a human home.
 Two important events in animal research also occurred around the turn of the 20th 
Century to draw some away from the somewhat persistent minority view that insisted on a 
mental continuum between humans and animals in their interpretations of Darwin’s theories.  
On one hand, the biologist Richard Garner published three works on the intelligence and 
language competencies of great apes (1892-1900).  On another hand, the horse Clever Hans 
rose to fame for its ability to do math, only to be exposed as, at best, a misinterpretation.  
Clever Hans has since become the greatest cautionary tale against anthropomorphism that is 
still recounted like a traumatic event by scientists (Wynne, 2001).
 Garner was controversial from the start in that he suggested that human speech arose 
from animal vocals, and that he could translate them (Raddick, 2008).  Though Garner gained 
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much attention for his claims, he was also ridiculed.  He was the first to employ a 
phonograph to record primate vocals for comparison (Radick, 2008).  Garner made numerous 
trips to Africa to study and record chimpanzees in the wild, and he even brought one 
chimpanzee, that he claimed was language competent, home with him.  However, Garner’s 
accomplishments were never taken very seriously, especially after he proposed that 
enculturated chimpanzees would make excellent laborers (Radick, 2008).  Robert Yerkes 
once noted that, “Garner was not adequately trained...and failed to command the scientific 
resources of his time” (1925).  Later, he went further to say that Garner’s publications 
“...indicate[d] a serious lack of scientific competence” (1929).  Garner’s level of fame and 
attention and his less than rigorous scientific methodology, painted early interests in ape 
language abilities in a negative light.
 The life of Clever Hans compounded the difficulties of studying animal minds 
exponentially around the turn of the century.  Raised by a German named von Osten, Clever 
Hans was reported to be able to do complicated math and possess the intelligence of a 14-
year old child (Wynne, 2001).  Though Clever Hans could answer arithmetic questions 
through tapping his foot, he had to see the questioner and that person had to know the correct 
answer to the question in the first place.  Apparently von Osten, unbeknownst to himself, had 
trained Clever Hans to respond to subtle, near unnoticeable, movements in the questioner that 
would initiate as Clever Hans reached the correct answer.
 By the time Clever Hans had been exposed, he had already been verified as an 
authentic genius by one panel of experts.  Though Clever Hans was very intelligent, he 
wasn’t intelligent in the way von Osten had advertised or believed and the backlash over this 
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unintentional deceit can still be felt today.  Controls for the Clever Hans Phenomenon, that 
animals can pick up cues from experimenters that the experiments don’t even know are being 
emitted, is now integrated into almost every experimental methodology concerning animal 
research (Wynne, 2004).  While this improved scientific methods, it also further contributed 
to an air of skepticism and negativity towards any research that implied human level 
processing in animals.
First Half of the 20th Century- Psychology, Linguistics, and Waning Interest in Gestures
 The first half of the 20th Century followed the tumultuous end of the 19th.  As 
evolutionary perspectives and questions of origins fell out of favor in anthropology and 
linguistics, and ASL was abandoned in deaf education, advances in psychology moved away 
from the Wundtian framework.  The few advances made in the study of gesture during this 
time, however, set the stage for the re-emergence of the discipline in the second half of the 
century.
 Psychology during this time generally eschewed gestures.  The two dominant 
approaches were the Behaviorism of B.F. Skinner and the psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud, 
which each left little room for the study of gestures and other consciously controlled 
behaviors.  In psychoanalysis, behaviors of the subconscious and irrational were privileged.  
The entire discipline focused on the operations that occurred in the mind beyond those which 
could be controlled, such as language.  Though gesture sometimes received attention in this 
framework, it did so only as a means to uncovering other subconscious motivations, rather 
than as a focus in and of itself (Kendon, 2004).  
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 Behaviorism focused on behaviors that could be reduced to simple explanations such 
as conditioned reflexes and reinforcement and generally avoided higher order processes such 
as language (Skinner, 1953).  Though Skinner eventually attempted to explain language 
through a behaviorist framework, in Verbal Behavior (1957), this explanation quickly 
became the center of what is widely considered the greatest debate on language in the 20th 
Century.  
 During this period, another factor that led to the dismissal of gestures within 
psychology was the institutional separation of linguistics from psychology.  Linguists moved 
away from the theoretical concepts of behaviorists and psychoanalysts towards the Wundtian 
semiotic framework of the 19th Century.  Both linguistics and psychology sought to 
differentiate themselves from one another in an effort to establish each as a unique field of 
inquiry.  A great deal of this move came from the work of Boas and his students, including 
David Efron and Edward Sapir (Kendon, 2004).  They each displayed an interest in language 
that emanated from a desire to disprove, through any and all avenues, the racist science of 
racial inheritance produced by Nazi theorists.
 Sapir is largely known for his work on the language abilities of American immigrants 
and for co-proposing the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis articulating the concept of linguistic 
relativity.  Linguistic relativity holds that the language one speaks influences the way that 
person thinks.  As such, individuals may perceive their world through the filtering lens of 
their language (Sapir, 1927).  Sapir primarily focused on the verbal aspects of language, 
however, and only briefly mentioned gestures.  He noted that gestures were the creation of 
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cultural traditions and his theories allowed for the inclusion of a gestural aspect, though he 
himself never investigated this (Sapir, 1927).
 Boas’s student, Efron, however, paid his full attention to gesture and his 1941 study is 
believed by many to be a seminal work in the field.  Most gesture studies and coding 
schemes still in use today are derived from Efron’s study of immigrant and ‘assimilated’ 
Europeans in New York City.  His methodology focused on observing gestures in situ during 
normal everyday interactions.  While this ethnographic approach was fairly groundbreaking, 
it left Efron open to critiques because the analysis depended on his subjective observational 
skills (McNeill, 1992).  Though he employed film to record some interactions, these films 
were generally silent and limited in their informative aspects.  Efron is also responsible for 
the modern categories of gesture coding that are employed in this study.  He broke gestures 
into physiographics and kinetographics (iconics), ideographics (metaphorics), deictics 
(points), and batons (beats).  Importantly, Efron also proved that gesture use was culturally 
derived, rather than biologically inscribed, which further reinforced the work of Boas and 
Sapir (Efron, 1941).
 An important aspect of Efron’s study was a kinesic analysis of the parameters of how 
gestures were used and moved in space.  He calculated how gestures engaged in spatial 
relations between people and how they were employed given the physical limitations of 
reach (Efron, 1941).  This research coincided with that of Edward Hall and George Trager 
who attempted to incorporate ‘paralanguage’, or aspects of voice and body motion beyond 
words, into a linguistic paradigm that was primarily focused on segmented verbal speech 
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(1953).  This work, in turn, influenced Ray Birdwhistell to expand kinesics as a parallel of 
linguistics (1952).  
 Birdwhistell defined kinesics as the study of all bodily motion.  He believed that body 
movements could be parsed and analyzed with the same techniques structural linguistics used 
with speech.  Though he thought gestures were outside the boundaries of what he was 
proposing to study, he influenced a number of his students, including Adam Kendon, towards 
the explicit study of gestures (Kendon, 2004).  
 Unfortunately, kinesics never flourished as a discipline because it emerged so close to 
the time that Noam Chomsky’s work became popular and reoriented all of linguistics.  
Chomsky focused linguistics on the internal mental apparatus that allowed the human brain 
to understand grammar (Chomsky, 1965).  Within the Chomskian framework, gesture was 
once again relegated to being unworthy of study as a component of language.  Instead, it was 
often placed within the category of ‘performance’ behaviors.
The beginnings of Ape Language Research
 Yerkes attempted one of the first co-rearing studies with a chimpanzee, Panzee, and a 
bonobo, Chim, during the 1910’s-20’s.  He believed that previous studies of chimps had been 
insufficient and poorly conducted.  In his book on his experience raising the apes, Almost 
Human (1925), Yerkes devoted a full chapter to ape speech.  Despite his disdain for Garner’s 
work, he did believe that apes were capable of spoken language.  To Yerkes, it was not a 
question of ability, but rather exposure and teaching that prevented apes from speaking.  In 
his research with Chim and Panzee, Yerkes failed to train them to speak, though he believed 
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they were able to communicate in their own way.  Furthermore, he believed the failure to be 
a result of his inadequate teaching and not the apes’ capabilities.
 Concurrent with Yerkes’s experience with Chim and Panzee, a chimpanzee, Joni, was 
raised in a human home by Russian researcher N.N. Ladygina-Kohts (1935 [2002]).  
Ladygina-Kohts’s work compares the early development of a chimp and her son.  However, 
this is not a true co-rearing study in that Ladygina-Kohts’s son was not born until nine years 
after Joni.  Instead of attempting to formulate theory, Ladygina-Kohts focuses primarily on 
compiling as much observational data as possible for comparison studies.  Joni and Roody 
also experienced far different early rearing conditions, with Joni living in a cage and Roody 
being raised with full human freedom.  Ladygina-Kohts, to her credit, notes that this disparity  
in rearing conditions no doubt led to the majority of the differences between Joni and 
Roody’s cognitive abilities.
 Though Joni died at the age of four, Ladygina-Kohts tried to gather as much data as 
possible on her communicative abilities.  Like others, she believed that given the proper 
instruction and context, the chimpanzee would develop human speech.  Ladygina-Kohts 
devotes an entire chapter to what she calls ‘Conditional Language.’  She clearly distinguishes 
that Joni showed a degree of spoken language comprehension, and modified his 
communicative skills to meet the requirements of the environment in which he was living.  
Ladygina-Kohts calls this a ‘conditional language’ that arose through a system of co-
mediated interactions over a course of time (Ladygina-Kohts, 1935 [2002]).  Despite her 
other deficiencies, this insight and her focus on gesture in Joni’s communicative strategies 
were important advances in early ape language studies.
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 With the discovery of Amala and Kamala, discussed above, the question of the 
prominence of either nature or nurture intrigued what psychologists were not invested in 
behaviorism or psychoanalysis.  However, the ethical implication of sending a human child 
out to live among animals was unacceptable.  Therefore a few researchers attempted the 
inverse experiment of raising apes in a human home. The thought was that perhaps an ape 
only needed the proper rearing environment to express human-like language capabilities, 
specifically speech.
 Combining the efforts of Yerkes and Garner with the recent information on Amala 
and Kamala, Winthrop N. Kellogg initiated one of the earliest true cross-species co-rearing 
studies in which he raised a female chimpanzee, Gua, along with his human son, Donald.  
Gua was loaned to Kellogg, as an infant, directly from Yerkes.  For this study, Kellogg 
stressed that in order for any co-rearing experiment to work, the ape must be treated entirely 
as a human in all regards so as to avoid and bias.  As such, Gua lived in Kellogg’s house, ate 
at the table, and did generally everything with Donald.  The two developed at almost 
identical rates but Gua lagged behind Donald in only her speech (Kellogg and Kellogg, 
1933).  In every ape language study, the chimp generally developed normally but never 
became able to produce speech as the human children did.
 Kellogg’s original hypothesis, that Gua would develop aspects of human behavior 
through early exposure to human culture proved true.  What he did not anticipate, however, 
was that this cultural blending would be a two-way exchange.  Kellogg’s son Donald took on 
some of Gua’s more ape behaviors, such as extensive biting.  It had not occurred to Kellogg 
that his human son would take on aspects of supposedly chimpanzee behavior and it was 
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primarily this development that caused Kellogg to end the co-rearing experiment (Kellogg 
and Kellogg, 1933).
 Kellogg’s apparent failure to produce human language in a chimpanzee did not deter 
subsequent attempts.  By 1968, Kellogg had seen several attempts to get a chimpanzee to 
speak like humans that were all ultimately unsuccessful.  The most notable example is that of 
Hayes and Hayes who raised a chimpanzee named Vikki in their home.  They worked for 
several years to get Vikki to produce vocal approximations of three English words, and even 
went so far as to physically mold her mouth to help with articulation.   The Hayeses 
concluded, however, that Vikki’s productions were only minimally distinct and required a 
large amount of effort to produce and did not come close to approximating human speech 
(Hayes and Hayes, 1951).  The work of the Hayeses served as the final confirmation that 
apes were too different in their throat anatomy to produce human speech.
 Kellogg, to his credit, was undeterred by this development.  He set about, with his 
collaborators, to go at the question of ape language abilities in a different way.  If apes were 
slightly different biologically, he believed that they could still be similar enough cognitively 
to acquire language through other mediums besides speech.  He focused on the broader 
question of language instead of speech, and in doing so changed the medium to be used for 
linguistic communication to sign language.  In 1968, Kellogg notes that the “spontaneous use 
of gesture movement by a chimpanzee raises the question whether this ability to gesture can 
be developed into something more” (426).
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The re-emergence of Gesture Studies- From Washoe to Goldin-Meadow
 The the Chomskian revolution in formal linguistics and the failure of the Hayeses, 
Kellogg, and Yerkes to get apes to develop language, two near certainties came into the 
public perception.  It was believed that speech was the true form of language and that apes 
were incapable of speech, thus language was uniquely human.  In spite of the academic 
momentum associated with this perspective, gesture and ape language studies both slowly 
became relevant again in the second half of the 20th Century.
 Advances in technology played a significant role in the study of gestures.  As noted 
previously, Efron employed videos to a very limited extent in his study of immigrant 
gestures.  Soon after, however, video recording technology advanced to the point where it 
could record audio and visuals simultaneously at real-life speeds.  The anthropologist 
Gregory Bateson was the first to employ this technology in the study of human 
communication (Bateson and Mead, 1942).  Bateson’s recordings of veterans’ families and 
their interactions showed that much more was going on in communication besides the words 
that were spoken (Ruesch and Bateson, 1951).  Video with audio and visuals freed 
researchers from the immediate moment of observation to allow for a more complete 
consideration of communication.
 An outgrowth of this technological improvement of methodology is the development 
of cybernetic and information theory.  These frameworks proposed that communication could 
be analyzed in systematic ways as a code.  It also provided a convenient way of including 
both speech and other modalities.  They were considered similar but different aspects of the 
communicative code with speech classified as ‘digital’ and nonverbals as ‘analog’ (Ruesch 
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and Bateson, 1951).  Within this coding scheme, nonverbals were largely considered 
unconscious and not subject to intentional control, even though they were acknowledged to 
be significantly communicative.  Unfortunately, Bateson and others dismissed nonhumans 
from this framework and made unfounded statements that, though animals employ ‘analog’ 
behaviors, they don’t do so at the same level of humans (Bateson, 1968).
 At roughly the same time, a few psychologists and primatologists took on Kellogg’s 
suggestion that apes may be able to learn gestural communicative systems.  The early 
attempts to study language in nonhumans early in the twentieth century (Ladygina-Kohts, 
1935; Kellogg, 1931), were somewhat ad hoc and fairly relaxed in their methodology.  As 
noted above, it was believed at the time that apes would spontaneously acquire language 
through early exposure to human communication, and thus rigorous methodology was not 
required.
 The vocal studies were unsuccessful and seemingly sloppy, but it was still presumed 
that apes had the cognitive capacity to understand and use language, even if they did not have 
the proper vocal apparatus with which to speak.  A new study on honeybees indicated that 
they had a form of communication system far more complex than their small brain would 
indicate possible (von Frisch, 1956).  This and other studies further encouraged ape language 
researchers to continue to pursue different modalities of cross species communication, 
especially given the similarities between the human and great ape brains.  
 American Sign Language (ASL) became the primary system employed in ape 
language studies studies beginning with the work of Allen and Beatrice Gardner who trained 
a chimpanzee, Washoe, with some success (Gardner and Garnder, 1969).  Washoe displayed 
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incredible complexity and flexibility in her signing.  Given her success, a number of studies 
replicated the work of the Gardners.  The most notable replications included the chimpanzee 
Nim Chimpsky (Terrace, 1979), the orangutan Chantek, Pongo pygmaeus (Miles, 1980), and 
the lowland gorilla Koko, Gorilla gorilla (Patterson, 1978).
 Given the apparent success of apes in learning and employing ASL, many began to 
question whether language was still the one defining ability of humans as posited by many 
including Chomsky.  Additionally, the seeming contradictions of information theory with 
regards to human and nonhuman analog communications led to the further studies into the 
differences between human and animal communication.
 In an effort to clear up the human animal divide, Charles Hockett created a system for 
analyzing and comparing communication systems across species in his 13 design features of 
language (1966).  Hockett’s design features are nuanced in that they allow for degrees of 
communication along a continuum rather than forcing everything into discrete ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
categories in a strict dichotomy. Unfortunately, Hockett’s design features were heavily 
centered on his own preconceived notions of language, rather than as an open analysis of 
available data.  A large number of the design features are reliant on, or emphasize, spoken 
language over other modalities.  Hockett’s framework was also constituted in a way that only  
humans could fit all 13 design features.  Whether this was a product of the objective facts or 
a display of his bias is debatable.
 Two other trends increased interest in gestures during this period, both in some ways 
connected to Washoe’s success.  On one hand, ASL regained prominence as a legitimate 
language.  In 1960, William Stokoe published a full structural analysis of ASL that 
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established that it was a complete and fully functioning language in the same way that 
English was (Stokoe, 1960).  Importantly, Stokoe showed that language did not have to be 
spoken to be equivalently complex, developed or communicative.  If one removed the verbal 
emphasis from Hockett’s design features, ASL would meet all 13 conditions.
 Secondarily, questions of language origins again emerged and, like Tylor and Wundt 
before, many believed gestures were the key.  Gordon Hewes (1977) published a lengthy 
formulation of the gestural theory of language origins drawing from the literature on both 
ASL and Washoe.  By attaching gestures to the important theoretical question of language 
origins, Hewes brought significant attention to the subject.  Gestures became a central, 
widely applicable, scientific concern through this process.
 Since the 70’s, gesture studies have been common.  The recent literature on gesture 
can be divided into two main areas of investigation: those concerning humans and those 
concerning apes.  Within the human portion, there is an emphasis upon the gesture usage of 
pre-linguistic infants (Butcher and Goldin-Meadow, 2000), bilingual children, and 
congenitally blind individuals (Iverson and Goldin-Meadow 2001).  In the ape literature, 
much investigation has gone into determining whether or not apes use gestures, and if so, 
whether they are in fact symbolic and communicative as opposed to simply emotional/
instinctual reactions (Tomasello, 2008).
Within human studies, there are several recent findings that elucidate upon our 
knowledge of gesture use in communication.  Gestures have been found to be present in all 
cultures in conjunction with speech, regardless of the language.  While the gestures change in 
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both their form and temporal placement in association to differing styles and/or formations of 
speech, they are nevertheless a constant in human communication (Goldin-Meadow, 2003).
 Though gestures are now extensively studied, there is some hesitance to treat them as 
equal to vocal language in terms of their communicative ability.  Freedman Van Meel et al. 
(1986) suggest that gestures merely serve to facilitate vocalizations, but do not add any 
communicative aspects to the utterance on their own.  Their believe is that gestures prime 
vocals by initiating certain neurological pathways by representing, but not communicating, a 
concept while the brain processes the verbal expression of that concept.  The work of Hadar 
and Butterworth (1997) elaborated upon this view by describing gestures as tools for lexical 
retrieval.   In other words, manual gestures supposedly fill spaces in communication while 
brains search for the proper words to use.
 In 1991,  Krauss, Morrel-Samuels and Colasante performed a study that further 
denied gestures a role in communication.  In a series of experiments, subjects were asked to 
classify gestures and determine the words that accompanied gestures in videos in conditions 
of both with and without sound.  Despite the fact that their subjects performed above chance, 
Krauss, Morrel-Samuels and Collasante determined that subjects were not able to glean 
information from gestures in the same way they could from verbal words.  They concluded 
that gestures were not richly informative to communicative interactions and only display 
redundant information in conjunction with speech.
 Susan Goldin-Meadow believes that such studies are biased in that they both take 
gestures out of their normal context when videos are played without sound and are based 
only on information matches between gestural and verbal modes (2003).  By studying 
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gestures in situ and looking at information mismatches between mediums, she has discovered 
that often gestures and words convey contradictory information and this mismatch suggests 
that gestures speak along with words, not as tools of words.  Another important aspect of this 
work is that it indicates that some gestures inform their receivers as well as their producers of 
information that the producer may not be aware of in words.  Numerous other studies have 
since looked at how gestures convey and communicate information independently of speech 
and assist in the processing of information in speakers (Kita, 2000).
 Those that believe gestures and words are equal do not agree on how or what gestures 
represent specifically.  For instance, McNeill (1992), Kita (2000), and De Ruiter (2000) all 
believe gesture and speech to be integrated aspects of a singular communicative process.  
However, each has a different opinion on what gesture does within this process.  For 
McNeill, gestures serves as an instantaneous, imaginistic, global augmentation to speech 
(1992).  In this framework, speech can only represent things sequentially while gestures 
represent inner mental images.  On the other hand, Kita (2000) supposes that gestures are 
outward manipulations of virtual (or imagined) objects in what is called spatio-motoric 
thinking.  For Kita, gestures are a more literal translation into bodily action of what the mind 
is conceiving.  Lastly, De Ruiter (2000) believes that both gestures and speech go through 
parallel linear information processes.  Like McNeill, De Ruiter’s concept of gestures allows 
for them to express what words cannot by funneling the unspeakable meaning into bodily 
movement.
Adding to the universality of gestures is the fact that congenitally blind individuals 
who have never observed gestures or the objects/actions they represent use hand gestures 
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when speaking with others.  What is more, they use them at the same rate that individuals 
with sight do.  Even more remarkable still is that when conversing with another person that 
they know is also blind, both individuals still use gestures while talking and use them just as 
frequently as they would in any other circumstance (Iverson and Goldin-Meadow 2001).  
Though many findings contest the innateness of spoken language, these findings suggest that 
there may be an innate propensity for gesture.  This would make evolutionary sense if there 
were a continuum in which a gestural communication system evolved as a precedent to 
spoken language and goes further back in our evolutionary past than the development of the 
human vocal tract.  This is also suggested by the fact that deaf children create their own 
gestural communication system without cultural input or knowledge of any other 
communicative system (Goldin-Meadow, 2003).
Another study found that individuals who suffer from speech impediments also had 
these impediments ingrained in their gestural production.  People that suffer from stutters 
produced gestures that, in essence, stuttered as well.  Their gestures were executed and 
terminated in conjunction with the start and stop of verbal phrases.  Massive interruptions 
caused longer pauses in gesture  (Mayberry and Jacques, 2000; Feyereisen, 1997).  This can 
be significant as gestures occur with 80-90% of all spoken words in adults (Mayberry and 
Nicoladis, 2000).  While this does not immediately advocate for the primacy of gestural 
language, it does show that it is an integrated part of human communication that is not 
entirely distinct from other modalities.
Infants, throughout their development, have often been employed as windows into the 
evolutionary past, especially in terms of communication.  Gestures are a common focus of 
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research since most infant humans do not produce speech words until later in their 
development.  Babies from 9-15 months old were shown to understand gestures before 
spoken words (Butcher and Goldin-Meadow, 2000; Corballis, 2002; Iverson et al., 1994).  
Apparently, the mental capacity to understand gestures is active long before modes of 
producing and fully comprehending spoken language are developed (Butcher and Goldin-
Meadow, 2000; Corballis, 2002; Iverson et al., 1994).  This also supports the hypothesis that 
gesture arose first in our evolutionary past.
It has also been shown that babies use gestures before they have effectively mastered 
anything more than monosyllabic utterances (Corballis, 2002; Iverson et al., 1994).  Children 
under 18 months were studied during an exclusively monosyllabic stage of their vocal 
development, and none of these children were able to move into a two-word speech without 
the help of gestures to bridge the gap (Butcher & Goldin-Meadow, 2000).  Furthermore, 
human children employ gestures frequently when they lack the words to express complex 
concepts (Goldin-Meadow & Butcher, 2003).  Use of gestures allowed children to express 
and learn ideas that they could not verbalize (Goldin-Meadow & Butcher, 2003; Singer et al., 
2008).  Therefore, gestures allow children to access meanings that are not available to them 
through their current vocabulary.
In terms of studies on primate communication and gestures, the vast majority of 
research has been focused on vocalizations in wild populations (Pika, 2008).   Out of 553 
published studies surveyed by Slocombe et al. (2011), 64% dealt exclusively with primate 
vocalizations while only 9% looked at gestures.  It is commonly accepted that alarm calls and 
other vocalizations can serve as referential signals (Cheney & Seyfarth, 1990), but many 
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doubt whether these calls actually function communicatively at the same high level as human 
language (Liebermann, 1998).  Recent work on gestures in primates is extending our 
understanding of gesture as a communicative modality across species.  In basic observational 
studies, apes have been seen using gestures to communicate in both captivity and the wild 
(Corballis, 2002).  
Primate gestures are seen in highly social contexts such as grooming, play, eating, and 
sex.  Hobaiter and Byrne posit that there were 66 distinct gestures in one wild chimpanzee 
population in Uganda (2011a).   In a separate study, Hobaiter and Byrne found that older 
chimpanzees used more single gesture utterances while younger individuals strung them into 
multi-gesture chains (2011b).  Chimpanzees have been observed to alternate their gazes 
between the intended receiver of their gesture and the referent and they typically wait for a 
response, which indicates that they possess a level of theory of mind and intend to 
communicate their own information/ideas to others (Tomasello, 2008).  Orangutans (Pongo 
pygmaeus) in captivity have been shown to employ gestures extensively and vary them in 
accordance with their human audience’s displayed comprehension (Cartmill and Byrne, 
2007).  Extensive work has also documented variable gorilla (Gorilla gorilla) gestures in 
both wild (Genty et al., 2009) and captive settings (Tanner and Byrne, 1996).
However, like vocalizations, there is an amount of skepticism associated with the 
level of symbol representation inherent in primate gestures.  As Leavens et al. (2005) note, 
gestures such as pointing are seen only as a behavioral manipulation of human caretakers (‘I 
want that’), rather than as a communicative act of joint attention (‘I want to understand that’). 
Hobaiter and Byrne (2011a) suggest that, despite their flexibility, audience adjustments, or 
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other complex features, ape gestures, that ape gestures form a family-typical common 
repertoire.  Gestures found in captivity, as such, are seen as artifacts of human influence or 
illusory and not a part of ‘true’ ape gestural repertoire.  Hobaiter and Byrne conclude that 
because there seems to be a common family-wide repertoire with little to no innovation 
regardless of context, that apes may not require nor appreciate the need for symbolic 
referential communication (Hobaiter and Byrne, 2011a).
Much of the recent work on primate gestures has been continually linked to the 
investigating the possibility of a gestural origin of modern human language abilities in the 
same vein as Hewes (1977).  It is believed that because both apes and humans employ 
gestures, albeit somewhat differently, that our common ancestor also used this modality of 
communication.  This theory has been further bolstered by the findings that the neurological 
components of gesture use, including mirror neurons, are present and function the same in 
nonhuman as well as human primates (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998).  The activation of Mirror 
neurons also reinforces the work of Kita, who suggests that gesture use is actually the mind’s 
way of interacting with a virtual (or imaginary) world/object, rather than as a symbolic 
representation of a mental image (2000).  Additionally, gestures are still seen as being better 
suited for analyses of language abilities across species given the anatomical differences as 
well as the fact that gestures are more readily employed flexibly in new and different 
contexts by all primates (Pollick & de Waal 2007).
Ape Language Research since Washoe- From ASL to Lexigrams
 Ape language studies have primarily focused on one medium of communication at a 
time, e.g., ASL, lexigrams, or vocalizations.  The earliest studies were so wrapped up in 
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verbal communication that they often neglected to note or acknowledge when the apes 
employed other modalities in lieu of their voices.  After Washoe’s success, gestures as ASL 
became the main modality of focus.
 While these ASL studies provided evidence that apes could act symbolically and 
seemingly communicate with humans given the appropriate medium, their validity was 
questioned.  Many of the apes employed short cuts in the signs or altered their expression for 
easier production (Terrace, 1979).  Because of this variability, each sign had to be 
subjectively interpreted by a human individual.  Though the training methodology was often 
rigorously structured and scientifically quantified, the resulting gestural production by the 
apes was of only questionable scientific value.  The general sense by the end of the 70’s was 
that the need for interpretation and subjective judgments reduced the efficacy of this branch 
of ape language studies (Rumbaugh, 1977).
 By 1979, Herbert Terrace, the primary investigator of the Nim Chimpsky project, 
determined that Nim was not linguistically competent.  His paper “Can an ape create a 
sentence” published in Science noted that Nim was merely mirroring and echoing the signs of 
his human counterparts and could not create his own sentences (Terrace et al., 1979).  
Terrace’s critique of his own project became a watershed event for ape language studies.  The 
focus of his criticism, coinciding with the dominant Chomskian framework of the time, was 
on grammar and the rule bound combination of symbolic units into sentences.  All of Nim’s 
utterances were labeled non-linguistic as a result and no effort was made to understand what 
Nim knew of language or symbols.
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 In light of the critiques of sign language studies, David Premack initiated the first 
printed symbol based language study with a chimpanzee, Sarah (Premack and Premack, 
1983).  Sarah used tokens with printed symbols to make decisions and communicate with her 
human caretakers.  Another symbol based project originated with Duane Rumbaugh.  The 
LANA Project, 1972, continued this experimental trend and attempted to teach a chimpanzee, 
named Lana, to use a keyboard of abstract symbols to refer to concrete objects and construct 
grammatical sentences (Rumbaugh, 1977).  Because Lana’s symbols were connected to a 
computer, every utterance was recorded and everything she did could be quantified.
 Lana learned to produce language-like sentences but seemed to do so only as a result 
of strict conditioning.  Her life was constrained to a single room and most of her interactions 
were with the computer.  However, as time went on, her caretakers gave her more direct 
contact and social enrichment.  While Lana could produce grammatical, language-like 
statements, it was believed that she could not actually comprehend the full symbolic nature 
of the lexigrams she employed.  Rather, she was said to be displaying list learning, and a 
specific sequence of behaviors.  For Lana, the symbols were merely the means to an end, 
either food or other forms of enrichment and not representations of real-world objects 
(Savage-Rumbaugh, 1986).  
 The lexigram based methodology, however, did not end with Lana as Premack’s had 
with  Sarah.  Immediately following the LANA Project, the lexigrams were employed with a 
pair of chimpanzees, Sherman and Austin, who could communicate with one another to share 
food or tools (Savage-Rumbaugh, 1986).  Sherman and Austin were intentionally co-reared, 
like Yerkes study decades earlier, in the hopes that the social aspect would enable fuller 
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language comprehension.  They believed that Lana’s deficiencies were a result of her social 
deficiencies because language can only take place between two or more individuals.  The pair 
was able to communicate with their human caretakers and one another easily during the study 
period.
 They often solved complex tasks through communicative interactions also. In one 
test, they had to ask one another for an objects removed in space, in another room, and they’d 
have to retrieve the specific object (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1983).  They used televisions to 
get information about rooms or objects that they couldn’t see and could communicate this 
information to others with lexigrams (Savage-Rumbaugh, 1986).  Also, they were able to 
categorize symbols into other symbols.  For instance, they could label objects as either 
‘foods’ or ‘tools’ and use these lexigrams as overarching categories (Savage-Rumbaugh, 
1984).  Lana repeatedly failed this test (Savage-Rumbaugh, 1984).  
Kanzi- Past and Present
 Kanzi, a bonobo (Pan paniscus), was born some time in 1980, in the middle of the 
period in which Sherman and Austin were the focus of lexigram studies.  For his early 
rearing, he was allowed to stay with his adopted mother, Matata, while she was going 
through early training in lexigrams.  It is during this developmental period that Kanzi 
apparently was enculturated into symbol-use and language via early exposure to the efforts 
focuses on Matata (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1993).  In a way, his upbringing combined the 
ad hoc practices of early co-rearing studies, such as Kellogg (1933), with the more 
scientifically structured Lexigram-based methodology that began with Lana (Rumbaugh, 
1977).
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 Kanzi’s use of lexigrams and his comprehension of spoken English are well 
documented and have been extensively studied.  The biggest studies have focused on how 
much Kanzi comprehends, in contrast to many other ape language studies which focused on 
production.  It is empirically shown that Kanzi has the receptive competence for spoken 
English that matches that of a two and a half year old human child (Savage-Rumbaugh et al, 
1993).  A large number of the analyses of Kanzi’s productive competence focus on micro-
analyses of specific concepts or words, such as the moral categories of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ (Lyn 
et al., 2008).  As such, this has left some critics to come up with their own conclusions on 
Kanzi’s productive abilities using only limited data without any direct experience 
communicating with Kanzi.
 Kanzi’s early rearing situation and spontaneous acquisition of lexigrams was 
recounted in a 1986 article in Journal of Experimental Psychology: General (Savage-
Rumbaugh et al., 1986).  The article focused on Kanzi’s early rearing environment and 
spontaneous acquisition of lexigram productive competence.  All of the data was from 
Kanzi’s early life, up to the point that he was four years old.   Despite all the subsequent 
publications on Kanzi’s abilities in the following three decades, the psychologist Clive 
Wynne chose to use this single study as his data for a criticism of Kanzi’s productive 
competence (Wynne, 2001).  Wynne’s contention is that Kanzi isn’t symbolic because his 
mean utterance length is only 1.15 symbols per utterance, which doesn’t allow for chaining 
multiple words together into grammar bound sentences.  Wynne’s critique focuses on a 
Chomskian linguistic framework while also reusing the classic question from Terrace’s paper, 
“Can an ape make a sentence?”
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 In the three decades since Kanzi was born, he has been extensively studied.  Through 
a language-rich world, Kanzi has developed linguistic competencies that are beyond that of 
any other ape yet studied (Segerdahl et al. 2005).  In addition to his receptive competence for 
spoken English, he has been shown to modulate some of his vocalizations in approximations 
of human words (Taglialatela et al, 2003).  He communicates plans about what he wants to 
do in the near future and is able to navigate a 20 hectare forest to achieve those desires 
(Menzel et al, 2002).  In a study of visual stimuli, he was shown to follow abstractions of 
pictorial stimuli beyond the ability of non-language competent control apes (Persson, 2008).   
While, for example, other apes will only recognize a banana within a color photograph, 
Kanzi can make this assignation even when the image has been progressively reduced in its 
visual aspects to something as bare-bones as a black and white outline. Kanzi has also 
mastered the ability to bimanually percuss flint to produce Oldowan-like stone tools (Schick 
et al., 1999).  Many of these abilities, such as bimanual percussion and vocal manipulation, 
were originally thought to be beyond the biological limits of apes, and a number of them are 
beyond the abilities of humans during different stages of development (Segerdahl et al., 
2005).
 Though Kanzi’s world is enriched in unique ways by his linguistic interactions, most 
of the published work, including Wynne’s critique of Kanzi’s competencies, focuses on the 
lexigram keyboard.  The lexigram keyboard, for all its benefits, was designed primarily for 
ease and reliability of data collection rather than ease of communication.  As the 
aforementioned trajectory of ape language research indicates, practical consideration of 
increased scientific objectivity in the interpretation of utterances was the primary concern.  
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 Work with Kanzi has shifted since the turn of the 21st Century.  Whereas early studies 
followed in the somewhat psychological school with formal testing situations, a number of 
recent studies have shifted to a more anthropologically based framework (Segerdahl et al., 
2005).  This shift is methodologically as well as practically influenced.  In many ways, it 
allows for a continually changing, enriched captive life for Kanzi.  The new emphasis has 
been placed on Kanzi’s cultural experience using more ethnographic tools during everyday 
experience while steadily relying less on formal testing situations (Fields and Segerdahl, 
2008).
 Another theoretical advance in the work with Kanzi is an attempt to understand how 
Kanzi exists within a cultural continuum (Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 2005).  Because Kanzi 
lives with both humans and non-linguistic control group bonobos, it is believed that he 
inhabits a middle ground between these two cultural ends.  The idea of a Pan/Homo cultural 
continuum allows for a flexible interpretation of each successive generation of language-
competent and control group apes as they differentially engage with a captive environment 
that has two different sets of rules and expectations from the two species involved (Savage-
Rumbaugh et al., 2000).
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS
Study Site 
 All research was conducted at the Great Ape Trust of Iowa (GATI), a cognitive 
research institute located at 4200 SE 44th St, Des Moines, IA 50320.  At the time of data 
collection, the Trust housed a colony of seven bonobos (three language enculturated, three 
nonenculturated, and one infant) and a separate group of two orangutans (neither 
enculturated through the methodology of Savage-Rumbaugh).  Great Ape Trust is a 501(c)(3) 
not-for-profit organization.  The bonobo and orangutan facilities are situated on a 230-acre 
campus that includes woodlands, wetland and a 30-acre lake.
! The bonobos are housed in the main building of the GATI campus.  All seven 
individuals are part of a cohesive family unit that has been co-housed since moving to Des 
Moines, IA in 2005.  The bonobos are shifted daily and are generally allowed to fluctuate in 
their group compositions, resulting in a nearly organic fission/fusion group dynamic.  Daily 
routine often includes shifting for breakfast, cleaning, performing a research task (either 
computer enabled or with staff), lunch, brief wellness/medical checks (such as weight 
collection and wound inspection), social interaction time, and then bed at the end of the day.  
Research activities can last from under 30 minutes to several hours depending on the task and 
the number of individuals participating.  In clear weather, the bonobos are granted access to a 
seven acre outdoor yard.
My study employed archival video stored at the Great Ape Trust of Iowa.  The 
Japanese broadcasting company NHK filmed hundreds of hours of footage throughout the 
1990s and produced three documentaries that were shown in a number of countries, including 
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Japan and the United States.  This footage was converted to digital and archived at the GATI.  
The archive includes video files labeled numerically from 0001-0414.  Videos are roughly 
30-50 minutes long, though there is some variance.  A second set of videos was created by 
staff over the past three decades with handheld cameras.  It has also been converted to digital 
and stored on the same Great Ape Trust servers as the NHK data.  Again, videos average 
around 40-50 minutes long.  They are labeled from 0042-4929 though non-continuously.  
That is, some numbers are not used and there are gaps in the numerical labels.
Subjects
  Kanzi is a 30 year old, adult male bonobo.  Kanzi was born in 1980 at the Yerkes 
Primate Center in Atlanta, GA and was adopted by Matata, a wild caught bonobo who is now 
around 40 years old.  In 2005, Kanzi and his family (7 other bonobos, including Matata) 
moved from the Language Research Center in Decatur, GA to The GATI in Des Moines, IA.  
Kanzi has been engaged in non-invasive cognitive research involving printed symbols and 
language use/comprehension since he was six months old.  His enculturation has lasted 
throughout his life and continues to this day.
My analysis focuses on Kanzi as a single individual for a number of reasons.  First, 
the original critique by Wynne (2001; 2004) only comments on Kanzi’s linguistic abilities.  
Second, ape language has long been a field that placed emphasis on the achievements of 
singular individuals verified through extensive trials.  So, while the number of individuals is 
statistically problematic, their abilities as individuals are rigorously tested.  The power is in 
the number of repetitions/trials rather than the number of participants.  This epistemology 
does not attempt to address the specific linguistic capabilities of apes in general, as one might 
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if they were to assume all apes were culturally and biologically equal, but rather attempts to 
probe the potential limits of great ape cognition and physiology.  The question is not ‘what do 
apes do’ but ‘what are apes potentially capable of.’  Kanzi has been employed as an example 
of the behavioral, cognitive, and cultural plasticity inherent in nonhuman great ape 
phenotypes for nearly three decades.
 Finally, the structure of the video archive and its contents restrict my analysis.  While 
the files show all three language-enculturated apes, they do so variably.  Kanzi is the main 
focus and is seen throughout the videos, primarily as an adult with supposedly full language 
competencies.  In contrast to Kanzi is Nyota, the youngest of the three at 13 years old, who 
was born while the video was being collected.  As such, much of the footage of him shows 
him as an infant or toddler, if at all.  Panbanisha is shown, but she ages from a juvenile to an 
adult as the files advance through time.
Behavioral Methods
 In accordance with numerous other studies of gesture use in social situations, 
(Mayberry and Nicoladis, 2000; Ekman and Friesen, 1969; McNeill, 1992; Singer et al, 
2008), video data was coded for manual gestures and lexigram use.  Manual gestures were 
coded according to a modified version of McNeill’s (1992) gesture-coding scheme including 
points, beats, and iconics (Appendix A).  McNeill’s coding scheme was useful in that it 
focuses almost entirely on manual gestures.  The three categories noted above comprise the 
main categories of possible gesture types as proposed by McNeill (1992).  Points are 
conscious and indicative, whereas beats are thought to be primarily unconscious, though no 
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less communicative, spontaneous movements that accompany speech (Kendon, 2004).  
Iconics are representative of real objects/actions to the point of being memetic reenactments.  
These gesture categories fall along different points within ‘Kendon’s continuum’ as 
expanded by Gullberg (1998) and can be used to categorize gestures according to their 
representative quality.  On the one end, “gesture is used in conjunction with speech, it is 
global and holistic...idiosyncratic in form and users are but marginally aware of their use of 
it” (Kendon, 2004: 104).  Beats would fit this side of the spectrum.  At the other end of the 
continuum, “gesture is used independently of speech, it is compositional and 
lexical” (Kendon, 2004: 105).  Iconics occupy this end of the spectrum, as they are fully 
metaphorical.  Lastly, points and other deictics fall in a middle ground in which they can 
have varying degrees of abstraction and representational qualities.
Lexigram use, though technically a result of a manual gesture, was coded as its own 
category separate from other manual gestures.  Lexigrams are an entirely different modality 
of communication that is neither true vocal speech nor pure gesture.  To communicate via the 
lexigrams likely requires different schemas, abilities, and proclivities than are found in a 
bonobo (as opposed to the ability to vocalize and manually gesture).
Analyses
 
Each video was preliminarily viewed to ensure that it included Kanzi as an adult and 
showed him using the lexigram keyboard.  When the video contained these two elements, it 
was accepted for coding and entered into the sample.  An incident of lexigram use was first 
considered a part of a larger multimodal utterance, rather than as a singular lexigram.  An 
utterance was coded as a string of lexigrams and/or gestures that were bounded by the speech 
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of a human caretaker.  As such, once a human began to respond verbally to Kanzi, his 
utterance was considered finished.  This provided a clear, easily distinguishable, if artificial, 
ending point for utterances.
Drawing upon my extensive first-hand experience with Kanzi and the video archives, 
I originally estimated that 10 utterances would be seen in each video.  Based on this estimate, 
I intended to code 50 videos to get a sample of 500 total utterances for analysis.  Video files 
were selected by using a random number generator found at the website ‘random.org’ to 
gather the first 50 numbers that coincided with the video archive file naming system.  Fifty 
videos were selected from the NHK archive and 50 from the LRC archive.  The first sample, 
however, produced far less than the 500 data points, so a second sample was taken of 25 
videos per archive.  The same methods were used for the second sample from the NHK 
archive but were adjusted for the LRC sample.  Of the first LRC sample, only one video out 
of 50 produced any acceptable utterances.  Therefore, the second sample was taken from 
videos numbered 3000-4929 in order to find more acceptable instances of Kanzi’s linguistic 
utterances.
Utterances were initially coded to track lexigram use and manual gestures coded as 
beats, iconics, and points.  This data was compiled in Excel and used to calculate a mean 
utterance length based only on lexigrams via a Wynne-inspired  unimodal method, on both 
lexigrams and gestures, via my multimodal analysis method, and a rate of multimodal 
utterance use.  Each observation was associated with a file name and a specific time within 
that file.  Aside from describing the utterance content and quantifying the utterance length, 
contextual factors were noted.  Location of the film, either indoors or outdoors, conspecific 
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presence, and human presence were all noted.  I also noted whether or not each utterance was 
spontaneous (‘S’) or a response (‘R’) and whether it was a repeat of a previously mentioned 
item from 0 (no repeat) through 5 (fifth repetition).  Lastly, “File Notes” includes more 
contextual information, such as whether or not the view of Kanzi’s hands was obscured.
Example of Observation Coding Scheme:
FILE TIME UTTERANCE CONTENT GEST
URE
GESTU
RE 
TYPE
UTTERANCE 
LENGTH
Conte
xt
S or R Repetition File 
Notes
EXAM
PLE
1:00 LEX(CHASE)-POINT 1 P 2 Indoors, 1 humanS 0
After coding, another individual secondarily coded video segments for lexigram and 
manual gesture use by Kanzi.  This person had a sufficient level of personal familiarity with 
the bonobos, defined as having directly worked with the apes at least 16 hours (two work 
days) a week for over six months.  Additionally, this individual had to have been involved in 
spontaneous lexigram-based interactions with the bonobos each day that they were present 
and was responsible for general ape care and the day-to-day maintenance of their captive life. 
This experience is important in that it forms the basis of shared experience from which the 
person coding can knowledgeably discern the subtleties of the bonobos’ bodily movements, 
which may not be readily apparent to an inexperienced outsider.  As such, coders were able to 
distinguish a communicative gesture from other movements, such as locomotion or eating, 
for example.  
The second person coded a singular video with the assistance of the primary 
investigator to establish clear code definitions and clarify the overall method of gestural 
coding.  The secondary individual then coded the remaining incidents of lexigram use for 
manual gestures in three videos.  Interobserver reliability among the two coders was above 
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the 90% threshold as to whether a gesture occurred and with 80% reliability on what type of 
gesture it was, so was considered a viable confirmation of my coding methods (Singer et al. 
2008).  Once the videos were deemed satisfactorily coded, the accumulated data was entered 
into a statistical program for analysis.  The exact results of this computer analysis are 
displayed in full detail in Appendix 2.  Discussion of the most relevant aspects of this data 
can be found in my results.
 The coding paradigm can be divided into three main phases, herein labeled 
Experiment 1, 2, and 3 for the sake of clarity.  All coding was done simultaneously and does 
not constitute separate processes, only different coding parameters.  The first experiment 
tests Wynne’s hypothetical mean of 1.15 lexigrams per utterance against the sample lexigram 
utterance mean length and multimodal utterance mean length.  Experiment 2 breaks the 
sample down into two categories, spontaneous and response utterances, to determine if either 
of these categories produced a significantly greater multimodal mean utterance length.  
Experiment 3 broke the sample into four categories based on the use of repetitions of 
common elements to see if this was a factor that influenced Kanzi’s multimodal mean 
utterance lengths.
Experiment 1
! The initial phase of coding determined how much flexibility was statistically 
acceptable in my methodology and tested the first portion of my hypotheses.  Kanzi’s 
utterances were not always clear in the archive videos.  Additionally, the target sample size of 
500 utterances was not met (Sample: 238 utterances) even with an additional sample of 
videos.  As such, it was necessary to determine whether including some unclear but 
59
acceptable, under less rigorous coding restrictions, utterances would impact my analysis.  
Inclusion of these utterances would bring the total of the sample up by 98 observations to 336 
total.
! The majority of the 98 additional observations were excluded for ambiguity initially.  
It was determined, however, that their ambiguity could be controlled through certain 
safeguards that could only underestimate the total utterance length of the observation.  
Because this analysis is not dependent on the linguistic content of the utterance, some 
confusion was acceptable if it did not artificially extend the utterance length.
! Once it was determined that both coding schemes were sufficiently similar, the looser 
condition was tested against the hypothetical mean of 1.15 mean utterance length in both 
pure lexigram and multimodal conditions.  Rate of multimodal utterances was also calculated 
for use in future analyses.  This rate could not be tested against Wynne’s mean of 1.15 
lexigrams per utterance as he did not do a multimodal analysis and only provided the one 
statistic by which to judge Kanzi’s abilities.
! The strict coding phase in which any questionable utterances were excluded was the 
original scheme.  This coding scheme omitted utterances in which Kanzi’s hands were not 
seen or when they were obscured, therefore making it impossible to determine if he 
performed any gestures during his utterance.  Additional video segments were eliminated due 
to unclear contexts, such as when a Lexigram was demonstrated for Kanzi and he was 
expected to repeat it, thereby throwing into question whether it was an actual act of 
communication.  Lastly, utterances in which the specific lexigram used was indeterminate 
were also eliminated.  
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 In the revised coding scheme, standards were loosened to a certain degree.  If Kanzi’s 
hands were obscured during an utterance, he was coded as not having gestured, and only 
lexigrams were counted as the entirety of the communicative event.  Furthermore, instances 
in which the specific lexigram was unclear were coded but without the specific lexigram 
noted.  These were scored as “Unknown” or “Unknown Lex” in these instances.   Because 
the specific linguistic content of the utterance was not a necessary component of this 
quantitative analysis, it was sufficient to know that a lexigram was used, even if it could not 
be specified from the video.  Instances in which Kanzi was prompted to press a specific 
lexigram were still not included in this analysis.  Any instances of lexigram use in testing 
situations, such as the receptive competence of spoken English, were never counted.
 Mean utterance length of pure lexigram utterances and multimodal utterances were 
then analyzed with SPSS v. 18 and tested against the hypothetical mean, supplied by Wynne, 
of 1.15 with a one sample T-test.    It was inherent in the methodology that the multimodal 
coding condition would create a larger mean than the pure lexigram utterance length mean.  
What was not known was whether the hypothetical mean was significantly different than the 
observed mean in each condition.  Then, the sample multimodal and unimodal utterance 
means were compared against one another in a paired sample T-test to see if multimodal 
analysis would significantly increase the mean utterance length observed.
Experiment 2
! In an effort to see which conditions correlated with greater mean utterance length, 
utterances were divided into categories of response or spontaneous communications.  This 
was influenced by recent work by Benson and Greaves (2011) in which they investigate the 
61
qualities of prompted speech.  I questioned whether Kanzi would be more or less loquacious 
when he was prompted to use the lexigrams or when he spontaneously attempted to 
communicate with no human instigation.  If he produced more during prompted speech, it 
could be inferred that his utterance length contained aspects of performance instead of pure 
communication.  These conditions were tested for coded for multimodal mean utterance 
length to determine if there was a significant difference between the two states.  Additionally, 
rate of gesture employment was calculated for further future analysis but not statistically 
analyzed between the two conditions given their similarity.  
! An utterance was considered a response if it was preceded by a question from a 
human that prompted Kanzi to answer via the lexigrams, or if Kanzi echoed a word uttered 
by a human caretaker verbally or through lexigrams in a preceding statement.  Utterances 
were coded as spontaneous if they had no connection to a human statement or were produced 
without prompting from a human caretaker.  These conditions were entered into SPSS v. 18 
and compared with a two sample T-test of their multimodal mean utterance length.
Experiment 3
 Lastly, I looked at the role of repetitions in Kanzi’s utterances.  Given the Gricean 
Maxim of Quantity (give as much information as is required but not more so) and my own 
experience interacting with Kanzi, I believed that his utterances would be as efficient as 
possible initially and would grow in complexity/length as needed (Grice, 1975).  I believed 
that, as Kanzi was asked to clarify himself or spontaneously desired to further communicate 
something again or with greater detail, his utterance length would increase as he elaborated 
upon the initial thought.  
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 To be considered a repetition, an utterance had to carry over a common linguistic 
component, particularly a lexigram, from an immediately preceding utterance by Kanzi.  
Each utterance was classified according to the number of times that Kanzi repeated a 
common element, the lexigram BANANA for example.  Repetitions only needed to contain a 
single element rather than echo an entire utterance.  This allowed for the coding to include 
elaborations of a singular thought/request by Kanzi.  Utterances were coded as 0- no 
repetition, 1- first repetition, 2- second repetition, and 3- third and higher repetitions.  (CITE 
STUDIES ABOUT REPETITIONS AND ELABORATIONS)  The highest number of 
repetition was 5- fifth repetition.
Repetition Utterance String Example:  NHK archive, Video 258.
 KZ  33:37- Lexigram (M&M).  
  0 Gestures.  Utterance Length= 1.  Repeat- 0.
 KZ  33:41- Lexigram (M&M, M&M).  
  1 Gesture- Beat.  Utterance Length= 2.  Repeat- 1.
 KZ  33:56- Lexigram (M&M, M&M)- Point, Beat, Lexigram (GRAPES).  
  2 Gestures- Point, Beat.  Utterance Length= 5.  Repeat- 2.
 KZ  34:20- Lexigram (SUGAR, GRAPES, M&M).
  0 Gestures.  Utterance Length= 3.  Repeat- 3.
 Each class of repetition was coded for multimodal mean utterance length for 
comparison with a one-way ANOVA test performed by SPSS v. 18.  Rate of multimodal 
utterance employment was also calculated but not tested for statistical significance because it 
was outside the experimental scope of this analysis.  Because a one-way ANOVA assumes 
equal variances across the sample, the ANOVA was further analyzed using a Brown-Forsythe 
test for multiple samples with unequal variances.  Furthermore, the categories were put into a 
Games-Howell analysis to determine if any of the individual categories were significantly 
different from one another.
63
CHAPTER 4:  RESULTS
Experiment 1
 The mean length of lexigram utterances was 1.46 lexigrams per utterance.  When 
tested against the hypothetical mean of 1.15, there was a significant difference with a p-value 
of <0.001.  This implies that Wynne’s sample, taken when Kanzi was merely four years old, 
is not representative of his adult productive competencies.
 When the multimodal mean utterance length is calculated, Kanzi’s mean utterance 
jumps to 1.85 units per utterance.  Like the unimodal, lexigram utterance mean length, this 
was also significantly different from the hypothetical mean with a p-value of <0.001.
 In a paired sample T-test, the multimodal utterance length mean and the unimodal 
lexigram utterance length mean were also significantly different with a p-value of <0.001.  
Gesture use, therefore, is a significant factor in Kanzi’s expressive production and 
significantly increases his utterances.
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Experiment 2
 The sample divided fairly evenly into the spontaneous and response categories, with 
162 and 157 total observations respectively.  These two conditions were relatively the same 
in terms of utterance length, 1.81 to 1.93 units per utterance respectively, and gesture use 
rate, 0.305 to 0.35 also.  When compared with a two sample T-test, these conditions were not 
significantly different, with a p-value of <0.379.  Kanzi did not appear to change his mean 
utterance length if he was responding to a human or speaking of his own volition.
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Experiment 3
 In the repetition coding scheme, the sample was broken down into 236 observations 
of no Repetitions, 60 First Repetitions , 22 Second Repetitions, and 16 Third and Beyond 
Repetitions.  The sample shows a specific upward trend for all conditions in the formally 
tested multimodal mean utterance length and informally gathered gesture rate up to the Third 
and Beyond Repetition class when the values return to the no repeat level.  
 Multimodal mean utterance length increased from 1.76 units per utterance in the no 
repeat condition to 1.98 units per utterance in the first repetition, to a maximum of 2.55 units 
per utterance mean in the second repetitions.  Using the Brown-Forsythe test, the difference 
between conditions was statistically significant with a p-value of <0.031.  The Games-
Howell analysis did not indicate that any specific values were significantly different from one 
another, however.  The 2 Repeats condition approached significance at the 95th percentile 
with a p-value of <0.137.  If a larger sample could be collected to increase the observations 
of second and third repetitions, it could increase the robusticity of the individual categories 
and potentially increase the significance of the differences between each category.
66
00.75
1.5
2.25
3
No Repeats 1 Repeat 2 Repeats 3 and Above
Figure 3: Mean Utterance Length by Repetition Category
Multimodal Mean Utterance Length
Unimodal Mean Utterance Length
Multimodal Utterance Rate
67
CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION
Kanzi’s results, what do they mean?
 Kanzi’s utterances illuminate some interesting aspects of his productive competence 
as well as our perception of it.  When analyzed from a unimodal perspective in the vein of 
Wynne (2001), Experiment 1 shows that Kanzi’s linguistic abilities have grown and matured 
as he has physically.  Data from Kanzi’s adult life shows a significant increase in his mean 
utterance length beyond the 1.15 calculated by Wynne using data procured during Kanzi’s 
youth.  This suggests that Wynne’s interpretation is based on a sample that represents of a 
period of Kanzi’s life that does not allow for Kanzi’s skills to mature and develop throughout 
his ontogeny.  Judging Kanzi, or other apes for that matter, as a static, essentialized entity, 
therefore, is problematic and limits our understandings of their competencies.
 Another key outcome to consider from Experiment 1 is the fact that incorporating 
gestures into the analysis significantly changed Kanzi’s mean utterance length.  Though 
multimodal analyses are more difficult, they allow for a more holistic and accurate 
interpretation of the communicative event.  This is especially true in the case of Kanzi, whose 
lexigrams form only a finite lexicon.  By excluding gestures, Wynne (2001) and other critics, 
significantly underestimate how much he is communicating in any given situation.  Kanzi is 
a multimodal individual who experiences language not just through lexigrams but in an 
embodied, holistic way (Segerdahl et al., 2004).  Gestures further move Kanzi’s production 
into multi-symbol utterances which, according to Wynne (2004) and other Chomskian 
linguists, would suggest aspects of syntactical rules in his linguistic productions.  An analysis 
of the grammatical content of Kanzi’s utterances was outside the bounds of this analysis but 
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may be a fruitful avenue of future investigations, especially if combined with a multimodal 
approach.
 Experiment 2 shows that Kanzi’s productive competence does not change 
significantly depending on whether he is prompted to speak or speaks spontaneously of his 
own volition.  This indicates that Kanzi employs the same productive strategies no matter his 
initial motivation to communicate.  It further addresses concerns over the Clever Hans effect, 
the idea that Kanzi’s ‘speech’ is more prompted performance than pure communication.  I 
originally assumed that Kanzi would be more loquacious in instances in which he produced 
utterances in a linguistic vacuum, unattached to other linguistic cues from interlocutors, 
because these would require extra information without a conversational scaffolding to build 
from (Benson and Greaves, 2005; Garrod and Pickering, 2004).  Experiment 2 suggests that 
the length and complexity of Kanzi’s communications reflect a different structuring strategy.
 Experiment 3 indicates that there are significant differences in mean utterance length 
and gesture rate depending on how many times Kanzi has had to repeat or reiterate his 
meaning.  Combined with Experiment 2, this suggests that Kanzi may employ the Gricean 
Maxim of Quantity in structuring his utterances in order to optimize the efficiency of his 
linguistic productivity (Grice, 1975).  The Gricean Maxim of Quantity holds that an 
individual will communicate only as much information as is needed at any given time but no 
more, thereby maximizing the efficiency of any communicative exchange.  In looking at the 
limitations of the keyboard mode of communication, employing the Maxim of Quantity 
appears to be a rational, optimizing strategy.  Unlike speech, which can be expressed and 
received easily under normal conditions, the keyboard requires the speaker to occupy their 
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hands in activating symbols and it requires that the listener to focus their vision on the 
symbols.  To align both these requirements is sometimes difficult, especially if conspecifics, 
be they bonobo, human or otherwise, are present.  Under these conditions, it is not surprising 
that Kanzi employs lexigrams only so much as is required in the specific context.
 The results of Expreiment 3 also fit Pickering and Garrod’s concepts of 
conversational feedback, which allows for interlocutors to align their perception and 
interactions (2004).  Within this framework, individuals first check to see if their message 
can be interpreted in its original form and then reformulate the utterance in a new way to 
establish implicit common ground.  Usually, this interaction occurs through the use of 
common elements, referred to as priming mechanisms, which are carried through the 
communicative interaction and remain a constant linguistic anchor for the conversation.
 The data on repetitions in this study was not statistically significant largely due to the 
varying samples sizes of the different categories (see: Results Section- Experiment 3).  After 
Kanzi’s original statement, he often carried through priming mechanisms and elaborated 
upon them with more lexigrams and gestures until his point was received.  The sample size 
for Kanzi’s original statements was substantially larger than that for repeats in the sample 
(243 versus 98, respectively).  This suggests that numerous studies of Kanzi’s productive 
competence may be heavily weighted towards original statements that are minimized in 
length not because he lacks grammar, but because he is attempting to be as efficient as 
possible through the Gricean Maxim of Quantity.  If Kanzi can be sufficiently 
communicative with a shorter utterance while minimizing the disadvantages of the lexigram 
keyboard’s interface, it is possible that he is employing an optimal strategy to achieve his 
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communicative and practical goals.  The important aspect to consider is that when asked to 
elaborate, or when he desires to elaborate, Kanzi can and does employ more specific and 
longer utterances.
Is Wynne wrong?
 Based on my analysis alone, I conclude that Wynne’s conclusions on Kanzi’s 
productive competence may be insufficiently supported and decidedly wrong.  His use of 
outdated data, his lack of direct experience speaking with Kanzi, his over-reliance on a 
unimodal analysis, and his study’s focus on only the most base aspect of Kanzi’s production, 
lexigrams, all limit his interpretations.  For Wynne, Kanzi’s mean utterance length is only a 
tool through which he attempts to answer the question of whether Kanzi has human levels of 
linguistic competency, as suggested by the perceived presence of grammar and syntax.  
 This study sought, first and foremost, to determine if Wynne’s methods were a viable 
way of analyzing Kanzi’s productive competence.  As such, it was a primarily quantitative 
analysis, concerned with mean utterance length and the proper methods of gathering that 
mean.  My analysis indicates that Wynne’s methods are not sufficient and his conclusions are 
inaccurate.  What is not addressed is Wynne’s overarching concern with grammar.  
 A more qualitative analysis of Kanzi’s productive utterances could yield insight into 
his syntactical competence.  As my study shows, however, it is important to situation any 
analysis of Kanzi’s abilities in the proper context, one without the common and outdated 
conceptual biases that often hinder such analyses.  Additionally, the emphasis on grammar 
and syntax is one that is arguably arbitrary, situated almost exclusively in Chomskian 
linguistics, and is not as highly emphasized by others (Segerdahl et al., 2005).  Whether 
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multiword utterances and grammar are indicative of the true nature of language writ large, or 
just a certain theoretical concept, has yet to be determined.
 The necessity of taking into account both multimodal and contextual factors can be 
shown in one example utterance from NHK video #186 (See Appendix 1: Data).  In the 
video, Kanzi is asked to tell caretakers, who are outside his enclosure, what item is hidden in 
a cooler.  From the 9:36 mark onward, primarily in response to prompting questions from 
caretakers, he mixes lexigrams with gestures, mostly points, in an attempt to tell the caretaker 
where to look.  Faced with failure to communicate effectively, at the 11:01 mark, Kanzi then 
says: LEX (UNKNOWN), GOOD, (UNKNOWN).  Using a strictly lexigram based analysis, 
this utterance would be three symbols long maximum.
 However, this is not the end of the utterance.  Kanzi switches modes to gestures to 
finish his expression.  The multimodal utterance is then: LEX (UNKNOWN), GOOD, 
(UNKNOWN), Clap (Iconic), Point (left), Clap (Iconic), Point (right), Drag Pointed Hand 
(Iotic- memetic).  The length of the utterance more than doubles to eight total signs once his 
gestures are incorporated.  Though anecdotal, this example is representative of the 
insufficiency of a unimodal analysis.  Significant aspects of communication are lost by 
focusing purely on lexigrams.  In terms of the gestural component of this utterance, Kanzi 
uses clap as an iconic gesture that means ‘chase’, ‘run’, ‘hurry’ or other variations on that 
theme.  This is one of his most commonly used iconic gestures, which has a consistent 
meaning across nearly all contexts.  When Kanzi drags his pointed hand, this is iconic in a 
more memetic way in that it is miming how he wants the humans to perform their chasing, 
running, or hurrying.  To roughly translate, then, Kanzi says to a human: UNKNOWN, [I am/
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will be] GOOD, UNKNOWN, Clap [Hurry/run], Point [that direction/there- outside his 
enclosure], [then] Clap [Hurry/run], Point [there- the door into his enclsure], Drag hand [to 
me/over here].
 The context of this example further reveals the complexity of the communicative 
event in ways that would be omitted through Wynne’s methodology.  This aspect of the 
analysis requires personal familiarity more than scientific expertise, however, and displays 
another shortcoming of Wynne’s perspective.  Given my own participant observation within 
Kanzi’s life, I am considerably more adept at interpreting each gesture within a consistent 
framework of meaning than Wynne is.  Take Kanzi’s utterances above and now imagine that 
they are directed at a blind caretaker.  He persists at his attempts to communicate with the 
humans outside his enclosure because he is prompted to, until his lexigram point combos 
prove too futile.  He then turns to the caretaker inside his enclosure and asks her to intercede 
on his behalf.  UNKNOWN, [I am/will be] GOOD, UNKNOWN, Clap [Hurry/run], Point 
[that direction/there- outside his enclosure], [then] Clap [Hurry/run], Point [there- the door 
into his enclsure], Drag hand [to me/over here]. 
 Given the shortcomings of Wynne’s study, it is difficult if not impossible to accept his 
dismissal of Kanzi’s linguistic abilities from a purely methodological point of view. And yet, 
to treat Wynne’s entire analysis as a matter of purely objective scientific inquiry would be to 
miss the larger point here.  Wynne’s study is emblematic of the metaphysical, rather than 
scientific, denial of animal minds that is embedded in a culturally created, ontological 
framework that precludes actual investigation into subjective animal experience/cognition.  
This framework exalts humans and their mental capacities while positioning animals as 
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humanity’s mental and moral antithesis.  Additionally, Wynne continually works to maintain 
the human/animal divide in his ardent criticisms of any studies he deems to be 
anthropomorphic (2007).
 This is as much a study and test of the interpretations of Kanzi’s abilities as it is an 
examination of the abilities themselves.  In this, both Clive Wynne and Kanzi can illuminate 
aspects of the perception of the human/animal divide, its continued maintenance through 
production of knowledge, and the ways our science is often subject to cultural beliefs, rather 
than objective rationality.  One must hope that it is possible, through self analysis, to 
circumvent such biases in the future.
The Impacts of the Human-Animal Boundary
 Binary oppositions are a primary aspect of structuralist thought, as championed by 
Claude Levi-Strauss.  Though the act of dividing the world into binaries was seen to be a 
fundamental and universal piece of human cognition, the individual constituent parts of the 
binaries often varied between cultures, creating difficulties for that aspect of the theory.  In 
Western thinking, one of the most commonly used and reinforced binaries is that which 
divides humans from animals and, by extension, culture from nature.  This division is often 
thought to be self-evident, yet it is a highly subjective distinction that is the product of a long 
history.  The history of gesture studies and primatology must address the conceptual binaries 
through which they are constrained.  By employing a Levi-Strauss inspired analysis of these 
supposed binary oppositions, it is possible to look at the prevailing Western idea of the 
human-animal divide as a pervasive myth with numerous tangible consequences in the 
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modern world, especially with regard to our ability to objectively study nonhumans, and, 
subsequently, humanity.
 It is important to note, immediately, that the human-animal binary is often proposed 
without empirical justification and is frequently accepted as common sense (Calarco, 2008).  
However, Levi-Strauss noted that this perception of objectivity is common.  “Every 
civilization tends to overestimate the objective orientation of its thought and this tendency is 
never absent” (Levi-Strauss, 1968: 3).  The conceptions of the human-animal divide are 
infused with and constructed upon several other perceived divides that are all central to our 
definitions of humanity and human nature including but not limited to: physis-nomos, 
instinct-rationality, and nature- civilization/culture.  
 The myth of the human-animal binary has exalted humanity while diminishing the 
animal.  Not only has the concept allowed for western academics and intellectuals to construe 
or rationalize myths about human ‘nature’ and civilization, but it has also impacted the way 
that we process and procure certain foods.  As such, this Western binary is a cultural product 
that has impacts beyond the academic sphere.  Chicken production, for one example, would 
not have been able to reach the extreme commodification noted in Steve Striffler’s account of 
the transformation of chicken as a food, Chicken: The Dangerous Transformation of 
America’s Favorite Food (2005), without such a myth.  Though it may be too much to 
assume that without this myth, the exploitation of chicken as product (and by extension the 
labor that produces this product) would be impossible, the human-animal binary serves to 
enable such a system and empower it as intellectually and morally legitimate.  Until Western 
thought can address the myth of the human-animal/culture-nature divide as a construction 
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with harmful consequences, it will continue to negatively influence almost all of our dealings 
within the world.
 In thinking about animals as separate, devoid of true thought and morality (as Hobbes 
would have it), without true being (as Heidegger proposed), or as mere soulless automatons 
(as Descartes believed) we have, in many ways, removed animals from the realm of true 
study.  Because apes and other primates exist at the boundaries of both human and animal, 
they are often perceived through loaded, highly charged ideological frameworks that work to 
maintain the long-held conceptions of human unicity (Corbey, 2005).
 Many of the criticisms of ape language are based on culturally specific notions of 
human exceptionalism.  In fact, many of these concepts of human exceptionalism were once 
used to justify scientific racism.  When ‘human’ is employed as a category, it is almost 
always based on a certain subset of the entire human population.  As much as anthropology 
debates facets of humanity, such as gender or race, the vast majority of our discipline does 
not question the definition of humanity that we use to navigate these concepts.  Philosopher 
Elisa Aaltola observes that throughout western history, “humanity has often been defined 
against the negative: humans exist in opposition to other animals...This tendency is obviously 
not found only in philosophy, but is often taken as a self-evident ‘fact’ in any field of human 
inquiry” (2008: 175).
The Human-Animal divide and its offshoots
 The common thread of the nature/culture binary can be traced at least to 5th century 
BCE Greece (Sahlins, 2008).  It was then that physis (nature) and nomos (culture) were 
defined as oppositional concepts.  This divide was constructed in defense of a way of living 
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and was directly correlated to forms of governance.  Within this framework, the concept of 
the animal within the human was articulated.  The city and culture represented nomos, while 
human nature and independence represented physis (Sahlins, 2008).  Nomos and physis 
could both easily be construed as negative or positive in order to fit one’s political or 
philosophical agenda.  As Sahlins notes, “Depending on which of the two is privileged as the 
good thing and which is thought to impose itself on the other, the ‘Rousseauean’ sense of a 
pure nature and a corrupt culture has run second only to its ‘Hobbesian’ contrary in the 
longer course of Western history” (2008: 34).
 The divide between human and animal worlds is further reinforced by the origin 
narrative found in the Old Testament book of Genesis.  Verse 28 describes how humans were 
created separately from animals and were granted dominion over all living things.  “And God 
blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and 
subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over 
every living thing that moveth upon the earth” (Gen. 1.28). 
 As time went on, physis was often represented by animals or animal-like qualities, 
while nomos was represented and solely possessed by humans (Sahlins, 2008).  This can be 
seen especially in caricatures of apes and ‘primitive’ indigenous peoples who were both often 
ridiculed and portrayed as brutish, childish, impulsive, and lascivious (Corbey, 2005).  In 
Leviathan (1651 [1982]), Thomas Hobbes further established a division between the natural 
and the human worlds.  In order to define humanity, he contrasted it with animals.  This 
comparison allowed Hobbes to attribute cognitive abilities to humans that set them apart 
from animals.
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 Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan was one of the most influential pieces of philosophical 
thought in the last millennium.  Among other things, Leviathan outlines the major differences 
between humans and animals by defining human nature in a way that justifies a human 
society as a form of control that overcomes individuals’ innate, animalistic natures.  The 
thoughts expressed in Leviathan have had considerable staying power and still inform 
numerous assumptions about society and politics.  This influence is especially present in 
early anthropological thinkers, who based their ideas of cultural evolution on Hobbesian 
concepts of unending individual competition and the need to overcome human nature.  
Hobbesian concepts of human nature also heavily influence Sigmund Freud’s theories on 
human behavior (Corbey, 2005).  
 Human nature, according to Hobbes, is not altruistic.  He surmised that the very 
mental capacities that set humans apart from animals lead to the negative results of war and 
strife, which he saw as inevitable.  Humans, with their powers of reason, can find fault in 
their surroundings and circumstances.  Animals simply know the world as it is and do not 
feel discontentment.  “Nor can man live, whose desires are at an end...Felicity is a continual 
progress of desire, from one object to another” (Hobbes: 66).  The ability to become 
discontent coupled with human desires, such as the  “[continual] competition for honour and 
dignity”  (Hobbes, 1651:113), creates the worst of human nature.  Humans can become 
discontent, and then display envy and hatred.  The price of our rationality is what Hobbes 
termed “bellum omnium contra omnes [the war of all against all]’ (Hobbes, 1651).
 Leviathan is mostly concerned with the ways people function in a political structure.  
Hobbes hoped to explain, through reason, why it was that humans could gather and 
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congregate together as societies in spite of their innate human nature.  Hobbes believed that 
these innate emotions could be overcome through the power of a sovereign leader.  “That 
during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that 
condition which is called war”  (Hobbes, 1651:84).  Leviathan philosophically justified and 
reinforced monarchy as a cure for the necessary anarchy that would result from basic human 
nature.  Herein, Hobbes also acts as an example of the ways that individuals have allowed 
their scholarship to be influenced by their overriding metaphysical and political beliefs.  
Rather than test his beliefs about human nature, he writes as if they are objective facts.  This 
is emblematic of thinkers who attempt to explain or define human nature.  As Corbey notes, 
“Metaphysical or ontological assumptions on the status of apes have...figured as conceptual 
or theoretical foundations in scientific research... [and] guide the accumulation, 
categorization, and interpretation of data” (2005: 13).  
 The tactic of defining humanity and culture against its supposed antithesis in animals 
and nature has seemed to be a staple of philosophical thought for millennia.  Beyond Hobbes, 
there is Rene Descartes.  In Descartes’s Discourse on Method (1637), he outlines a strong 
division between humans and animals.  Whereas Hobbes formulated his division within the 
concept of the great chain of being, a concept that allows for a certain amount of continuity 
between the humans and animals, Descartes postulated a strict divide between the two.  
Descartes’s division was based on the premise that only humans possess an eternal soul and 
follows studies of primates show the similarity of humans and apes anatomically.  Though 
they both share mechanical organic bodies, he believed, humans were the only beings with 
minds and souls (Descartes, 1637).  For Descartes, minds allowed humans to be rational, 
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moral, and social.  As such, they were the only entity who could both think and possess 
nomos.  The mechanistic concept of animals reduced them beyond living beings to the realm 
of objects.
 More contemporary thinkers have also continued the myth of human uniqueness by 
employing the human/animal dyad.  Karl Marx recapitulated Hobbes by stating that humans 
have a superior and unique mind that allows them to do more than any animal.  He states, “A 
spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an 
architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the 
best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in 
reality” (Marx, 1867).  This distinction allows Marx to further reinforce the unique human 
quality of labor and value-making that is especially prominent in Capitalism.  Furthermore, 
he notes that nomos in humans overcomes physis.  “Men are not settled by nature (unless 
perhaps in such fertile environments that they could subsist on a single tree like the monkeys; 
otherwise they would roam, like the wild animals)” (Marx 1858: 209).
 Early evolutionist anthropologists embody this bias in a number of ways.  Herbert 
Spencer, as opposed to Hobbes, did not need to rely on a strong monarch to pacify human 
nature, but allowed for a number of social systems to fulfill this role.  Spencer notes that 
every kind of government must adhere to the general desires of its subjects, therefore 
placating them to a degree that would permit organized society to occur.  “We all know that 
the enactments of representative governments ultimately depend on the national will...they 
result from the average of individual desires; or in other words- from the average individual 
natures” (McGee and Warms, 2004: 26).  In both cases, human nature has to be persuaded 
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(either by the will/force of a monarch or the acquiescence of representatives) into agreeing to 
live together instead of competing with each other as their innate ‘animal’ nature would 
require.  Spencer further reiterates the Hobbesian fear that without society humans would live 
in anarchy by noting that, “could it be suddenly abolished, a great proportion of us would be 
dead before another week was ended” (McGee and Warms, 2004: 25).
 Sir Edward Tylor and Henry Morgan also alluded to a universal human nature and the 
ability of civilization to overcome it.  Tylor’s concept of the progression of human cultures 
from savagery to civilization coincides with Hobbesian views of human nature as it depicts 
society as an increasingly more effective means of dealing with human nature and the natural 
world.  Within these perspectives, the animal relates to an innate human nature that must be 
overcome through cultural practices.
 Recently, Marshall Sahlins has examined the extensive cultural, biological, and 
philosophical inaccuracies that form the basis for the prominence of a Hobbesian view of 
human nature.  Sahlins contends that the idea of human nature as violent is a creation of 
Western thinkers, championed by Hobbes.  “Natural self-interest?  For the greater part of 
humanity, self-interest as we know it is unnatural in the normative sense: it is considered 
madness, witchcraft or some such grounds for ostracism, execution or at least therapy.  
Rather than expressing a pre-social human nature, such avarice is generally taken for a loss 
of humanity” (Sahlins, 2008: 51).  Sahlins concludes his essay succinctly;  “My modest 
conclusion is that Western civilization has been constructed on a perverse and mistaken idea 
of human nature” (2008: 112).
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 In the last Century, animals have still been placed in the categorical position of being 
the opposite of humans.  Similar to Marx, Leslie White, a prominent anthropologist, 
suggested that humans have abilities beyond any animal.  He states that “No ape...could 
appreciate the difference between holy water and distilled water- since there isn’t any, 
chemically” (Sahlins, 2000: 13).  According to this view, the cultural aspect of holy water 
(nomos) is lost on the purely physis driven animal.  Martin Heidegger also brings the division 
into modern philosophical discourse.  Though he does not value hierarchical evaluations of 
the human-animal divide, he nonetheless believes that animals do not possess the same 
quality of ‘being’ that humans have (Calarco, 2008).  In this sense, Heidegger reiterates the 
Hobbesian viewpoint based on a continuum often represented by a great chain of being.
Native Americans and human others at the Boundary of Humanness
 The parallels between scientific racism and human exceptionalism are numerous.  
Each constructs an other as inferior culturally and less than fully human in an effort to 
establish what ‘true’ human nature is and validate a certain worldview.  Over a century ago, 
at the beginning of Franz Boas’s career, the other was both apes and indigenous peoples, such 
as Native Americans.  Both groups have been seen, stereotypically, to exist in the conceptual 
borderland between physis and nomos.  As others, Indians and apes are sufficiently similar to 
the dominant group, EuroAmericans and humans respectively, to allow for comparison but 
different enough to allow for subjugation.  Until cultural relativism took root, it was common 
opinion that “while the Indians were likely human, they were not so in an unambiguous 
sense” (Stannard, 1992: 229).  Molly Mullin observes that “Animals were created to be 
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exploited by humans, and colonized people were more like animals than humans, the 
enslavement and exploitation of the colonized was in keeping with their nature” (1999: 205).
 American Indian ‘nature’ was often seen in terms of “primitivism, technological 
incompetence, physical distance, and cultural distance” (Deloria, 2004: 4).  They were 
thought to have inferior language abilities (Boas, 1889), little to no history (O’Brien, 2010; 
Stannard, 1992),   and no practice of dominion over the land and/or other animals (Anderson, 
2004).  As Stannard summarizes, “Indians...were simply ‘a part of the landscape’ who lived, 
like other ‘lurking beasts,’ in a ‘trackless wilderness,’ where they had ‘no towns or 
villages’...The cultures of these ‘redskins’ were, at best, ‘static and passive’” (1992: 12).  
Such accounts combined with the cultural evolutionary paradigms of Henry Morgan, E.B. 
Tylor, and Herbert Spencer, chiefly, to place Native Americans at a lower level of human 
evolution than Europeans.  Within these paradigms, Native Americans and other peoples of 
comparable development could be used as analogues to humanity’s evolutionary past 
(McGee and Warms, 2004).
 Boas’s refutation of cultural evolution “redirected anthropology away from 
evolutionary approaches closely linked to nineteenth-century racial theory” (Brown, 2008).  
His main contentions were methodological, citing that evolutionists assumed the very things 
that they were trying to prove.  
 Boas did much to promote a relative understanding of individual cultures without 
placing them within a hierarchy of development.  In 1889, he wrote a paper critiquing one of 
the more popular views of the time, that certain people (non-westerners) suffered from sound 
blindness and spoke in synthetic, alternating sounds which were indicators of primitive 
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language (and subsequently cognitive) skills.  In the instances in which developed Europeans 
encountered more ‘primitive’ indigenous cultures, there was a great deal of interest in 
discerning whether they were culturally evolutionarily primitive.  The 19th Century 
Evolutionists created an entire field that created hierarchical classifications of human 
cultures.
 In “On Alternating Sounds” (1889), Boas establishes, through 3 simple but reliable 
experiments, the idea that individuals experience other cultures through the lens of their own.  
He experimentally established that the perceived primitivity of the indigenous languages 
were not a facet of the language but rather a byproduct of the observers’ methods and cultural 
background.
 Boas further critiques aspects of the Evolutionist paradigm in The Methods of 
Ethnology (1920).  His objections can be summed up in his position that evolutionists 
propose a ‘retrospective’ interpretation of cultural history that “implies the thought that our 
modern Western European civilization represents the highest cultural development towards 
which all other more primitive cultural types tend” (Boas, 1920: 2).  He believes, on the other 
hand, “that there may be different ultimate and coexisting types of civilization” (Boas, 1920: 
2).  This was further reinforced by The Limitations of the Comparative Method of 
Anthropology, which states that, “Therefore the frequent occurrence of these forms proves 
neither common origin nor that they have always developed according to the same psychical 
laws.  On the contrary, the identical result may have been reached on four different lines of 
development and from an infinite number of starting points” (Boas, 1940: 60).
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 Yet, primates now fill the role of primitives in most models of human evolution 
(Sayers and Lovejoy, 2008).  And indeed, as Matt Cartmill notes, the same methodological 
problems still exist.  Unique human features “are uniquely human by definition rather than as 
a matter of empirical fact.  Much scientific effort has gone into redefining such 
characteristics whenever discoveries about other animals have posed a threat to human 
uniqueness” (Cartmill, 1990: 173).
 Boas, for all this innovative and critical work in unifying all humans as equals in 
contrast to the hierarchical views of evolutionists, also firmly established the divide between 
nature and culture in anthropology.  For Boasians, culture was the determining aspect of 
humanity as it was something that superseded uniform human biology.  In essence, Boas was 
able to unite humanity while reinforcing the human-animal divide, by pushing the line from 
primitives to primates.  Sahlins recapitulates this in his descriptions of human culture.  “The 
symbolic or meaningful [which] takes as the distinctive quality of man not that he must live 
in a material world, a circumstance he shares with all organisms, but that he does so 
according to a meaningful scheme of his own devising, in which capacity mankind in 
unique” (Sahlins, 1976: vii-viii).   This can be seen in the trend of cultural anthropologists to 
dismiss primatology and biological anthropology as not pertinent to the study of modern 
human culture (Corbey, 2005).  
 The essentialized view of chimpanzees is no more accurate than the once prominent 
view of the ‘primitive’ human.  Jane Goodall’s group at Gombe (Goodall, 1986) differs 
markedly from Christoph Boesch’s population in the Tai Forest (Boesch, 2009), and both of 
these sites are significantly different from the chimpanzees at Jill Pruetz’s site at Fongoli 
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(Pruetz and Bertolani, 2009).  Western primatology is just as embedded in classic notions of 
the human-animal dichotomy and even enacts its own distinction between physis and nomos 
in the widespread preference for wild observational studies as superior, or more accurate, to 
those in captive settings for informing our concepts of ‘real’ apes.
 Some contend that apes possess only “rudiments” of culture (Sapolsky, 2006), others 
refer to it only as “protoculture” (Laland and Hoppitt, 2003).  McGrew (2004) and Laland 
and Hoppit (2003) believe that to confirm culture in apes, behaviors must be shown to be 
“performed by a large proportion of the group” while de Waal (2001) contends that these 
behaviors must also be free from ecological or genetic determining factors.  Yet, the 
standards set for what can be considered a scientifically justifiable cultural behavior are so 
limiting that they could never be cross-applied to human cultural studies.  This is yet another 
example of the constantly shifting definitions that attempt to protect, rather than test and 
verify, human unicity noted by Cartmill (1990).  With such dichotomies in place, animal 
culture studies do more to reinforce our own idea of human nature and ability than they do to 
challenge these culturally constructions.
 Marshall Sahlins seems to be a strong proponent of cultural relativism and his work 
on human cultures is illuminating.  Yet he exemplifies many cultural anthropologists in 
reinforcing human exceptionalism in the Boasian school.  He subscribes to the view of Leslie 
White that apes could never appreciate or understand the symbolic aspect of human life and 
even repeats White’s quote about the chimpanzee and holy water (Sahlins, 2000).  According 
to this view, the nomos derived aspect of holy water is lost on the purely physis driven 
animal.  And yet, the perception of water as water by a chimpanzee is not incorrect in an 
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ultimate sense.  Humans continually deny the symbolic aspects of other cultures, yet Sahlins 
would then conclude that these individuals are without symbolic thinking.  Would Sahlins 
posit that rock climbers are not symbolic because they do not recognize the spiritual 
characteristics of Devil’s Tower in the same manner that the Lakota do?  
 To say that chimpanzees are less symbolic because they do not place the same 
meaning on something borders on ethnocentrism.  Sahlins, himself, critiques the arbitrary 
divide between nomos and physis in The Western Illusion of Human Nature (2008).  Yet he 
does nothing to address the hypocrisy of the Boasian method of moving the dividing line 
from the primitive to the primate.  As such, he does not address the ideological underpinnings 
or deconstruct the bias of this aspect of western ontology to give us a fuller sense of the 
origin, meaning, or function of the physis/nomos distinction.  Sahlins also falls short in 
showing the numerous other possible ontologies that have been observed and do not confine 
humans and animals into an oppositional binary.
 In the example of the Ojibwa, Irving Hallowell notes that they employ kinship terms 
when referring to numerous nonhuman entities from animals to certain rocks and natural 
phenomena (1960).  They conceive of personhood as “Not, in fact, synonymous with human 
being but transcend[ing] it” (Hallowell, 1960: 21).  The Ojibwa employ the equivalent term 
for ‘grandfather’ for both humans and spiritual beings.  For Hallowell, this extended kinship 
network illustrated the anthropocentric and Eurocentric nature of social system categorization 
schemes that western thinkers had developed for use with only human kinship ties.  Most 
anthropological research only incorporated and analyzed the human half of this kinship 
system.  By privileging western conceptions of the human/natural divide, anthropologists 
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missed large aspects of indigenous world systems.  In opposition to this bias, Hallowell 
believed that “if we adopt a worldview perspective no dichotomization appears...both sets of 
grandfathers can be said to be functionally as well as terminologically 
equivalent” (Hallowell, 1960:144).
 Another example of an ontology without a strict human-animal divide can be found in 
in Robert Brightman’s account of Rock Cree hunting practices (1993).   In his observations, 
Brightman found the Cree relationship with nonhuman persons involves aspects of 
reciprocity and mutual respect even in hunting relationships.  Nonhumans are seen as rational 
decision-makers who have some control over the outcome of hunts (Brightman, 1993).  
Brightman explains that within this hunting relationship, there is an unclear power hierarchy 
between humans and animal persons, which leads to two seemingly contradictory 
explanations for the outcome of hunts.  In instances in which the animals have power over 
the hunt’s result, Cree employ a benefactive model in which animals choose to give their life 
to humans in reciprocal gift giving for proper ritualistic treatment (Brightman, 1993).  When 
there is ambiguity about the power balance, explanations can shift to an adversarial model in 
which humans must use superior skill and craft to force an animal to give up its life.  Because 
nonhuman persons are not set aside the human realm, these two explanations can be 
employed as needed to mediate the social/political relationship that exists between hunter and 
prey.  Again, earlier accounts had often stressed a system of pure dominance between humans 
and animals, missing a large portion of the Cree’s ontological framework in the process.
 Paul Nadasdy (2007) furthers the trajectory exemplified by Hallowell and Brightman 
in critiquing anthropological reluctance to fully embrace native ontological views.  Whereas 
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Hallowell describes the Objibwa as seeing persons based on their actions, especially in terms 
of kinship relations, Brightman shows that the Cree define persons based more on their 
power over the outcome of events in the realm of politics and economic exchange.  Nadasdy 
(2007) both critiques the above anthropologists’ view of human/nonhuman person relations 
and also elaborates upon them with examples from the Kluane people. 
 He sees the ontological bias in interpreting human-animal relations as hindering both 
ethnographic understanding and wildlife management strategies.  Additionally, he notes that 
if anthropologists did not automatically dismiss accounts of nonhuman persons as elements 
of myth or religion, it would allow us to more accurately perceive other cultures.  “Very few 
Euro-American scholars are willing to accept the proposition that animals might qualify as 
conscious actors capable of engaging in social relations with humans” (Nadasdy, 2007: 29).  
This inflexibility is the main concern of Nadasdy’s critique.  He continues to say that “[They] 
ignore completely the animal side...thereby rendering invisible any social dimensions of 
human-animal interactions” (Nadasdy, 2007: 30).  At the same time that anthropology 
ignores animal contributions to social interaction, it also reduces the indigenous worldview to 
metaphor, denying it recognition as a literal and practical truth.  Western ontology is thus 
doubly limiting to our understanding of animals and other humans.  In all three of the above 
examples, the animal world is not defined in opposition to the human world and animals are 
not excluded from possessing certain mental or cultural capacities.
 In concluding The Western Illusion of Human Nature, Sahlins notes that, “Leading a 
life according to culture means having the ability and knowing the necessity of achieving our 
bodily inclinations symbolically” (2008: 135).  Stated as such, this does not exclude apes or 
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other potentially cultural animals.  However, Sahlins makes this statement within the classic 
Western ontological conception of animals as devoid of symbolic capacity, thereby 
reinforcing the human animal divide from which the physis-nomos conceptions spring.  
Other anthropologists have further reinforced this dichotomy even while attempting to 
eliminate some of its subsequent implications.
 According to “Is Female to Male...” by Sherry Ortner (1974), there are two major 
binary oppositions that allow for the supposed universal subjugation of females.  The first is 
the division between males and females.  Ortner believes that within this binary, there is a 
universal power relationship in which men are superior to women.  “Everywhere, in every 
known culture, women are considered in some degree inferior to men” (Ortner, 1974: 373).  
Secondarily, both aside from and entwined with the male/female binary, there is the assumed 
separation and opposition of culture and nature.  Ortner asserts that “every culture...is 
engaged in the process of generating and sustaining systems of meaningful forms...by means 
of which humanity transcends the givens of natural existence” (Ortner, 1974: 374).
 Like the male/female binary, which Ortner believes is infused with a universal power 
relationship, Ortner’s ideas about culture/nature are accompanied by several secondary 
assumptions.  For the culture/nature binary, there is also an innate power relationship that 
positions all culture above all nature (Ortner, 1974).  The crux of Ortner’s argument in “Is 
Female to Male...” is that these two binaries mirror one another with males and culture on 
one end and females and nature on the other.  “Women’s body and its functions, more 
involved more of the time with ‘species life,’ seem to place her closer to nature, in contrast to 
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man’s physiology, which frees him more completely to take up the projects of 
culture” (Ortner, 1974: 376).
 Ortner, like Hobbes, Descartes, and Boas, takes it for granted that nature and culture 
are inherently at odds in a hierarchical relationship.  She states that “Every culture implicitly 
recognizes and asserts a distinction between the operation of nature and the operation of 
culture...the distinctiveness of culture rests precisely on the fact that it can under most 
circumstances transcend natural conditions and turn them to its purposes” (Ortner, 1974: 
375-6).  Ortner does not provide more than her opinion as to the universality of this 
distinction, however, as though it were common sense.  It is yet another example of a 
Western ontology impacting scholarship.
Breaking through- Neo-Boasian Relativism across species
! Kanzi is not an anomaly.  Recent work in ethnoprimatology is illuminating how 
humans and nonhuman primates enter into mutual ecologies and co-construct their ‘niches’ 
with each other in wild settings (Fuentes, 2010).  Multispecies ethnography is investigating a 
number of other human/nonhuman interactions with an emphasis on ‘becoming’ in the sense 
of Deleuze and Guattari (Kirksey and Helmreich, 2010).  Investigations into wild ape 
cultures are also growing (McGrew, 2004).  Yet, these approaches are not cohesive and fail to 
address how ape cultures respond to captivity.  Apes do not cease to exist in a meaningful 
way when placed in a cage.  At a broader level, modern primatological studies often interpret 
ape cultures as inferior forms of human culture, in a hierarchical understanding, therefore 
neglecting to address what ape cultures can tell us about the nature of Culture writ large.  
This is a product of a particular worldview and scientific bias that extolls human 
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exceptionalism.  Kanzi is an overt example of a captive ape recognized as an intentional actor 
in a co-constructed system of meaning.  One step towards breaking through the divide 
between the primatological understanding of culture, and new efforts in cultural 
anthropology, would be to extend Boasian relativism to great ape cultures to begin to 
deconstruct the western conceptual divides between human and animal, culture and nature.
 In Kanzi, we have an overt instance of when two cultures, rooted in Pan and Homo, 
combine to produce a third.  He lives within a bicultural environment in which he 
appropriates and uses aspects of both human and bonobo systems of being (Segerdahl et al, 
2005).  Captive apes everywhere are engaged in processes of ‘becoming’ in which they are 
living with and around humans in a shared world where, as Fuentes says, “two species are 
simultaneously actors and participants in sharing and shaping mutual ecologies” (2010: 600).  
Yet, captive apes and their behaviors are often seen as not representative of their ‘true’ 
natures.
 Perhaps the most important aspect of Boasian relativism is the implication that 
difference does not necessitate inferiority; that equality is not dependent on similarity.  
Anthropology must ask itself how much difference they are willing to accept.  At present, the 
line is set at the species level, whereas in the past it was often at the level of human races.  
We must move beyond a system of definition that relies on a purely western metaphysics of 
life.  While anthropologists have written of the animal in the past, our understanding must go 
beyond that of treating nonhumans as being just a source of symbols or sustenance.  Animals 
are not just Marvin Harris’s cow, Mary Douglas’s pig, or Clifford Geertz’s cock.
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 Primatologists and cultural anthropologists can and should work cooperatively to 
implement a relativistic interpretation of great apes that is not beholden to the limiting and 
biasing western metaphysics of the human-ape boundary.  Relativism within wild ape studies 
is already practiced, even if it is not explicitly labeled as such.  Less accepted is the idea that 
captive apes possess ways of being equally valid and rich as those in wild settings.  Perhaps 
the most difficult implication of this interpretation is the idea that ape cultures can be just as 
rich and meaningful as human cultures and not dismissed as inferior a priori.  In such an 
academic environment, there would be no such thing as a ‘proto-culture’, just different 
cultures.
 Recently, Stephen Cowley and David Spurrett (2002) have re-analyzed the Kanzi 
literature (albeit briefly) removed from the narrow confines of the Cartesian concepts of the 
mind in a new paradigm of embodied cognition.  According to Cowley and Spurrett (2002), 
embodied cognition supposes that cognition is not only handled by the brain, but is 
“‘distributed’ in a range of ways between brains, bodies and world” (2002: 290).  It is this 
distribution, according to Cowley and Spurrett (2002) that allows Kanzi, a bonobo, to use 
aspects of human language.  Because cognition is not limited to the brain, even animals 
without a human brain can achieve the same sort of cognitive states through different means.  
This shift in perspective makes for a much more comprehensive interpretation of the Kanzi 
data, yet Cowley and Spurrett’s analysis fails in one major regard.  While it satisfactorily 
describes the cognitive processes behind Kanzi’s linguistic abilities, it does not attempt to 
deal with Kanzi’s cultural abilities.  An investigation of language or cognition without a 
consideration of culture is incomplete at the most basic level.
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 Cowley and Spurrett (2002) provide the proper lens with which to analyze Kanzi but 
they do not look at the entire picture.  They properly situate Kanzi’s cognitive abilities on a 
continuum with humans but fail to similarly study Kanzi’s culture.  According to Segerdahl 
et al, the language enculturated apes fall along a “Pan/Homo cultural continuum” in which 
apes can fluctuate depending on their exposure and acceptance of different cultures (2005).  
Cowley and Spurrett fall into the old evolutionist paradigm that ranks cultures hierarchically 
and dismiss apes as outside of the realm of human symbolic life.  They suggest that what 
Kanzi has is primitive and incomplete compared to humans (2002).  However, if culture and 
symbol use is removed from its metaphysical attachment to concepts of human unicity, then 
using Cowley and Spurrett’s concepts of congition with the refined Boasian cultural 
framework could offer whole new insights into what it means to be human and/or animal.
 Language-enculturated apes must be considered relatively, in the spirit of Boas’s 
historical particularism, as products of a particular historical and cultural context.  The 
language-enculturated apes and their human counterparts engage in and shape their cultural 
trajectory sui generis.  As Boas notes, “in historical happenings we are compelled to consider 
every phenomenon not only as an effect but also as cause”  (Boas, 1920: 4).  The embodied 
cognition perspective of Cowley and Spurrett widens the concept of cognition and language 
to decentralize human abilities.  It does not place human cognition alone upon a pedestal but 
rather shows that it follows the exact same limitations that all other minds/organisms 
encounter.  Biology and context (environmental, cultural or otherwise) interact constantly to 
co-create the mind.  
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 As the earliest ape language researchers surmised, apes share more than enough 
biology with humans that they only needed the proper environment in which to develop 
cognition/language in a human way (Kellogg, 1931).  Embodied cognition legitimizes this 
theory.  However, what it does not do is deal with the cultural differences and problems that 
arise within such studies.  Even some of the earliest of anthropological theory can 
supplement embodied cognition and ape language in a way that opens the door for a whole 
new world of investigation into what constitutes culture, language, cognition, and humanity.
 In Kanzi’s case, he rarely uses the symbols to produce grammatical sentences in the 
same way that humans do.  However, Savage-Rumbaugh et al. do not find this to mean that 
he lacks true language.  Rather, they propose that this shows that Kanzi is using his own 
language that borrows from both his human and bonobo heritage (Segerdahl et al, 2005).  
Kanzi’s linguistic capabilities have been tested with novel requests and his receptive 
competence for spoken English surpassed that of the human child that acted as the control 
subject (Savage-Rumbaugh et al, 1993).  Because Kanzi’s use of language varies from many 
investigators’ own, some are critical of the legitimacy of his abilities.  Yet, these critiques are 
entirely rooted in the human-animal metaphysical divide described above.  Additionally, this 
critique is the same phenomenon that Boas argued against in On Alternating Sounds (1889).  
The same critical, pre-Boasian concept that was placed on indigenous peoples over 100 years 
ago is being recycled and reapplied to Kanzi and his bonobo family.
 This is where Cowley and Spurrett and Boas come together to clear the confusion.  
Cowley and Spurrett (2002) point out that the question that most often plagues Kanzi is one 
that is rooted in an outdated paradigm of Cartesian models of the mind (though in actually, it 
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is far more complex and older historically than that).  Unfortunately, as they note, it was this 
framework that severely hindered ape language research in these studies looked for 
replications of human language/thought in apes.  They contend that Kanzi is linguistic but to 
a degree. What they stress, though, is that the degree is not important.  “We believe that his 
utterance-mediated understanding is evidence both that he uses a medium of public language 
and that it has effects on the computing powers of his brain” (Cowley and Spurrett, 2002: 
316).
 What Cowley and Spurrett bring to the table is a new concept of mind that 
fundamentally shifts our ideas of what language is.  Within this new framework, it is possible 
for Kanzi to produce some language but not all of it and still be a linguistic being.  Combined 
with Boas’s critique of alternating sounds, it makes a compelling case for accepting Kanzi’s 
language use as constituted in a specific cultural and cognitive setting, with its critics being 
ethnocentric and influenced by their pre-existing biases.  Kanzi uses language as much as he 
needs to within his specific situation.  It fits his environment and his body.  As Boas notes in 
The Methods of Ethnology, “[Developments through inner forces] may, however, be observed 
in every phenomenon of acculturation in which foreign elements are remodeled according to 
the patterns prevalent in their new environment” (1920: 135).
 Boasian concepts of historical particularism and cultural relativity worked because 
they were based on the commonality of all humanity.  It was assumed all humans shared the 
same basic biology, which left cultural forces as the main drivers behind differences.  Boas 
expresses this in Race and Progress, saying “Hereditary racial traits are unimportant as 
compared to cultural conditions...There is no reason to believe that one race is by nature so 
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much more intelligent, endowed with great will power, or emotionally more stable than 
another, that the difference would materially influence its culture” (Boas, 1931: 13).  Again, 
this paradigm need not exclude apes.  If biology is less important than culture, and apes are 
sufficiently cultural, are they not due the same relativistic understanding that other humans 
are?
 As Cowley and Spurrett (2002) show, if Kanzi and other apes can attain human levels 
of cognitive states, why can’t Boasian relativity be extended, if not to all of the great apes, 
then at least to those who are human enculturated?  Boasian cultural relativity is not 
inherently limited to humanity it merely was not concerned with other species at the time of 
its origin.  Current studies do not extend Boasian concepts beyond the human realm, but as 
Boas himself showed, dismissal of other cultures based on perceived primitivity is a flawed 
methodology.  Perhaps sooner, rather than later, investigations into ape cultures will 
incorporate more of the theoretical foundations of cultural anthropology into their 
perspectives.
 Michael Brown notes that Cultural relativism is essential to “keeping anthropology 
attentive to perspectives that challenge received truth” (2008: 363).  No received truths have 
been quite as pervasive as the divide between human and nonhuman worlds.  If relativism 
truly is “a check on conclusions that otherwise seem self-evident” (Brown, 2008: 372), then 
it can scarcely be avoided in dealing with the western divide between physis and nomos, 
nature and culture, or animal and human.  For Brown, relativism has three main components; 
methodological relativism, cognitive relativism, and moral relativism.  As shown above, none 
of these need exclude apes unless one is, as most have been historically, beholden to the 
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western ontology of a human-animal divide.  Just as nineteenth century racists assumed what 
they were trying to prove, we often assume animal inferiority and human superiority or 
unicity before it can even be tested.  What’s more, these tests rarely meet methodologically 
relative standards of “suspending judgement until a belief can be understood within its total 
context” or that one must “interpret a culture on the basis of its own internal web of logic 
rather than through the application of a universal yardstick” (Brown, 2008: 365).
 For all his excellent work, Marshall Sahlins still theorizes within a system that relies 
on a strict human-animal boundary.  Even as he writes, “As enchanted as our universe may 
still be, it is also still ordered by a distinction of culture and nature that is evident to virtually 
no one else but ourselves” (2008: 88), he maintains humanities unicity in its symbolic 
abilities.  Carol MacCormack echoes Sahlins while addressing the inadequacy of assuming 
human unicity.  “There is no way to absolutely verify that the nature-culture opposition 
exists...and there is no ethnographic evidence to suggest that in the form in which Europeans 
now conceive it” (MacCormack, 1980: 10).
 Extending Boasian cultural relativism beyond the human sphere into the realm of 
nonhuman apes is the first step towards recognition of nonhuman others.  Once we begin to 
see ape ways of being as independently valuable and worthwhile modes of existence and 
systems of meaning, the human-animal divide itself will cease to be justifiable.  At the very 
least, it can be analyzed while making human unicity a testable assumption rather than as an 
ontological truth.  This is a call “to pause before judging, to listen before speaking, and to 
widen one’s views before narrowing them.  That is what cultural relativism has always been 
about.  Today we need it more than ever” (Brown, 2008: 380).
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS
 This analysis started with the question of how many symbols Kanzi produces per 
utterance, especially when symbols from multiple modalities are counted, but soon grew to 
much more.  In the first of three experiments (see Results-Experiment 1), Kanzi’s mean 
utterance length was determined to be statistically higher than estimated by Clive Wynne’s 
(2001) analysis, even when using his unimodal, lexigram focused methodology.  
Additionally, it showed the quantitative value of including gestural analysis and combining 
analyses to give us a multimodal understanding of communication, as Kanzi’s mean 
utterance length increased significantly when a multimodal utterance length was compared to 
unimodal utterance length.
 Contextual aspects of Kanzi’s production was then tested in Experiments 2 and 3 (see 
Results- Experiment 2, Experiment 3).  Experiment 2 showed that Kanzi’s mean utterance 
length, in either unimodal or multimodal analyses, did not change significantly whether he 
was prompted to speak or spoke of his own volition.  This indicates that there is no 
significant Clever Hans effect or performance aspect of Kanzi’s utterances and that it can be 
assumed they are only geared towards social communication in a fully symbolic way.  
Experiment 3, however, indicates that Kanzi alters his utterance length according to the 
Gricean Maxim of Quantity (1975).  If he can communicate his needs with a single lexigram, 
he does so.  In practice, Kanzi is usually surrounded by people who are eager to help and 
serve him.  Many jump at his first request.  In situations in which he repeated himself or was 
asked to clarify, his mean utterance length increased with each successive repetition.  Limited 
sample size of higher repetitions limited the power of this analysis, but the indications 
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suggest that with a large enough sample, a statistically significant change will be seen in his 
mean utterance length with each repetition.
 Once the quantitative aspects of Kanzi’s utterances were calculated, it became 
obvious that Wynne’s (2001) analysis was cursory, seemingly poorly conducted, and 
predicated upon maintaining, rather than testing, a specific metaphysical bias.  The question 
then shifted to how he could have come to this conclusion, given that his data set is so 
obviously lacking.  Wynne is also a vocal proponent of preventing “naive presuppositions” 
from biasing interpretation of data, yet he fails to acknowledge that he carries his own 
presuppositions into his analyses (2007).  In this, my study then became as much about how 
we study Kanzi, and what this means about us, as it was about Kanzi himself .  I also 
attempted to explain why Wynne, who prizes objective, empirical studies, could promote 
such a flawed perspective on Kanzi’s abilities.  
 Wynne is a product of a prevailing worldview that has been in place for centuries if 
not millennia (see: Literature Review).  This worldview has impacted the way western 
thinkers have interpreted and studied gestures, apes, indigenous peoples, and even women.  
The ontogeny of the human-animal divide has been emphasized in religion, philosophy, the 
sciences, and in the practice of procuring and thinking about food (see: Discussion).  Wynne 
refuses to acknowledge what Donna Haraway (1989) posits; that when we study animals, 
especially primates, they are often used as vehicles for recapitulating and reinforcing our 
myths about the world and human nature.  When these presuppositions impact other lives, 
they must be analyzed critically, rather than tacitly accepted, as Wynne and other human 
exceptionalists do.
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 As much as anything, I had hoped that the empirical data from this study would prove 
what I have discovered through qualitative analysis and subjective participant-observation in 
Kanzi’s home: that when Kanzi and his family, and other apes generally, are taken as 
intentional actors situated within their own systems of being, and therefore as objects of 
anthropological inquiry, new insights into both human and nonhuman primate ways of being 
can be had.  Throughout history up into current studies, our ontological and metaphysical 
perspectives have limited our understandings and biased our results when they are taken as 
facts rather than assumptions.
 Kanzi and his family exist at the conceptual boundaries of human and ape, person and 
animal, and culture and nature.  As such, they have much to teach us about the validity of our 
most basic assumptions if we don’t allow those assumptions to dictate our results.  Kanzi’s 
abilities test ideas of humanity, the mind, culture, language and how we study each of these 
things.  The theoretical implications of Kanzi’s life and abilities reach far beyond the realm 
of cognitive psychology, within which Wynne articulates his perspective.  
 In anthropological terms, Kanzi’s abilities indicate that we should direct more focus 
towards multi-species ethnographic approaches, post-humanism, and ethnoprimatology that 
see human life as enmeshed in a biological reality that extends beyond humans themselves.  
Kanzi’s existence also proves that culture is not a uniquely human event and that cultural 
anthropology cannot exclude apes as pure mechanisms of biology devoid of symbolic 
reasoning a priori.  That Kanzi and other apes are not already interpreted within this 
framework illuminates some of the still present biases of cultural anthropology and suggests 
that ‘others’ still exist.
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 At the bridge between anthropology, psychology, and neuroscience, Kanzi shows the 
strength of embodied theories of cognition and culture.  Through an embodied perspective 
the classic human-animal divide at the very least loses its primacy and at most becomes 
entirely irrelevant.  The context and development of individuals becomes more important 
than their biological species, and classic dichotomies and contradictions in the strict human-
animal divide that Kanzi exposes become expressions of his unique cultural context rather 
than abhorrent behaviors that are corruptions of his essential bonobo-ness.  Embodied 
perspectives also provide a psychological framework in which Boasian relativism, with all of 
its methodological and ethical implications, can be extended beyond the human realm.
 This study seeks to question conceptual boundaries as much as provide answers to the 
original question of Kanzi’s linguistic productivity.  Though the ontologies of human-animal 
divide are long-standing and thoroughly defended, ethnographic examples show that they are 
not self-evident (see Discussion), nor are they the only way to conceive of the natural world.  
Kanzi’ is uniquely situated to assist us in reconceptualizing our world.  As Charles Darwin 
once wrote:  “Let man visit Ourang-outang in domestication, hear expressive whine, see its 
intelligence when spoken; as if it understood every word said- see its affection- to those it 
knew- see its passion and rage, sulkiness, and very actions of despair; and then let him dare 
to boast of his proud pre-eminence” (Darwin, 1987: 79).
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Appendix 1- Coding Data
NHK FILE TIME 
starts
UTTERANCE GESTU
RE
GESTURE 
COMMENT
UTTERA
NCE 
LENGTH
Sponta
neous 
or 
respon
se
Repetition File Notes
EXAMP
LE
235
139
-
360
417
126
366
186
-
-
-
-
-
-
236
206
108
376
160
347
266
80
258
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
1:00 LEX(CHASE)-POINT 1 P 2
X KZ= juvenile
1:11 LEX ( CHEESE-not counted, used foot, BALLOON) 0 1 S
20:29 LEX (DOG) 0 1 R
20:33 LEX (CHILDSIDE) 0 1 R
21:10 LEX (AUSTIN, AUSTIN) 1 B 2 R View of Hands Obstructed
X KZ not shown
X not in archive
X KZ not shown
X KZ not shown
0:45 LEX (GRAPE)- hand wave 1 I 2 R
3:01 LEX (SURPRISE) 0 1 S
5:05 LEX (PEANUT, SURPRISE) 0 2 S 1 view obstructed
6:29 LEX (COKE)- POINT 1 P 2 S
9:36 LEX (UNKNOWN)- POINT 1 P 2 R view obstructed
10:47 LEX (UNKNOWN)- POINT 1 P 2 S view obstructed
11:01 LEX (UNKNOWN, GOOD, UNKNOWN)- CLAP, POINT (L), CLAP, POINT (R)+ DRAG5 I,P,I,P, I 8 R
11:59 LEX (UNKNOWN, WATER, HIDE, LETTUCE, LETTUCE) 1 B 6 R
12:45 LEX ( COKE) POINT LEX (COKE) 1 P 3 R
12:53 LEX (COKE)- POINT 1 P 2 R 1
14:53 LEX (CELERY) 0 1
X KZ= juvenile
X KZ not shown
X KZ not shown
X KZ not shown
X KZ not shown
X KZ not shown
X No Utterances
X KZ not shown
0:11 LEX (BUNNY) 0 1 R
0:34 LEX (HAMBURGER) 0 1 R view obstructed
0:37 LEX (HIDE) 0 1 R view obstructed
0:43 LEX (BOX) 0 1 R
1:04 LEX (M&M) 1 R View of Hands Obstructed
1:10 LEX (M&M) 0 1 R 1
1:15 LEX (M&M) 0 1 R 2
1:18 LEX (M&M) 0 1 R 3
1:40 LEX (BANANA, BANANA, CLARA-accidental) Point 2 B, P 3 R
2:00 LEX (GRAPES)- Clap 1 I 2 S
2:05 LEX (GRAPES) 1 R 1 view of Hands Obstructed
2:21 LEX (TOMATO) 0 1 S
2:38 LEX (BANANA) 0 1 S
2:42 LEX (GRAPES) 0 1 S
2:52 LEX (PLAYYARD) 0 1 S
3:06 LEX (ONION) 0 1 R hands occupied
3:10 LEX (ONION, ONION, GRAPES) 0 3 R 1
3:35 LEX (PEANUT) 1 R View of Hands Obstructed
3:40 LEX (PEANUT- repeated several times) 1 B 2 R 1
3:56 LEX (GRAPES, ONION, OPEN, PLAYYARD)- Point 1 P 5 S
4:14 LEX (PLAYYARD)- Sweep towards body 1 I 2 R 1
4:17 LEX (CANDY)- Point 1 P 2 R
4:36 LEX (PEANUT) 1 S view obstructed
4:44 LEX (BOX, CANDY 0 2 R
4:47 LEX (WATERMELON)- wave towards body 1 I 2 R
4:49 LEX (CANDY)- Point 1 P 2 R
5:02 LEX (BOX)- Wave/point 1 P 2 R
5:16 LEX (BUNNY, CANDY, WATERMELON) 0 3 S
5:29 LEX (CANDY)- raises cupped hand to mouth, pats tummy 2 I,I 3 R
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NHK FILE TIME 
starts
UTTERANCE GESTU
RE
GESTURE 
COMMENT
UTTERA
NCE 
LENGTH
Sponta
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or 
respon
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Repetition File Notes
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
8:16 LEX (MILK, SURPRISE) 0 2 R
8:59 LEX (BALL) 0 1 S
9:11 LEX (WATERMELON, CANDY, MARSHMELLOW, PSUKE, KISS, CANDY) 0 6 S
10:21 LEX (CANDY, CANDY) 1 B 1 S 1 view obstructed
10:34 LEX (PLAYYARD) 0 1 S
10:49 LEX (SOME CANDY) 0 2 S
10:54 LEX (SOME) Hand raised to forehead 1 I 2 R 1
11:00 LEX (BOX)- hand flick outward 1 I 2 S
11:24 LEX (CANDY, TEA, SOME, SOME) 1 B 4 S View of Hands Obstructed
11:30 LEX (SOME SOME) 1 B 2 R 1
11:39 LEX (GRAPES) 0 1 S
12:07 LEX (GRAPES)- followed by some use of OUTDOORS in prompted situation 0 1 S 1
13:12 LEX (CANDY, WAIT) 0 2 S
14:32 LEX (SHIRT)- unknown if KZ utterance view obstructed
14:45 LEX (PINEAPPLE accidental. SHIRT, BALL OPEN OPEN) 1 B 4 R
15:42 LEX (BANANA) 0 1 S
16:09 LEX (VISITORS, CANDY, FRUIT) 3 S view obstructed
16:40 LEX (PLAYYARD, BANANA) 2 S View of Hands Obstructed
17:02 LEX (GRAPES, GOOD, GRAPES, CANDY, WATERMELON) 0 5 R
17:14 LEX (CANDY, VISITORS) 0 2 S 1
17:42 LEX (BALL) 0 1 S
18:12 LEX (MILK, MILK) 1 B 2 R
18:19 LEX (MILK) 0 1 R 1
20:56 LEX (AFRAME) 1 S view obstructed
20:59 LEX (AFRAME PLAYYARD GROUPROOM) 3 S view obstructed
21:03 LEX ( GOOD GRAPES CANDY MILK) 0 4 S
21:07 LEX ( MILK, OPEN YES OPEN) 0 4 R 1
22:06 LEX (MILK repeated) 1 B 2 S 2
23:16 LEX (GRAPES, GRAPES, GOOD, GOOD) 0 2 S
24:09 LEX (MILK, GRAPES) 0 2 S 1
24:55 LEX (GRAPES repeated) 1 B 2 S 2 view of Hands Obstructed
25:28 LEX (SURPRISE) 1 R view of Hands Obstructed
25.40 LEX (SURPRISE, SURPRISE, PEANUT, YES) 1 B 4 R 1 view of Hands Obstructed
25: 46 LEX (OPEN) 1 R view of Hands Obstructed
25: 49 LEX (KEY, KEY) 1 R view of Hands Obstructed
25:54 LEX (HIDE, KEY, KEY) 1 B 3 R 1 view of Hands Obstructed
26:05 LEX (GRAPES, GRAPES, GRAPES) 1 B 2 R view of Hands Obstructed
26:11 LEX (GOOD, GRAPES, GRAPES, GRAPES) 1 B 3 R 1 view of Hands Obstructed
26:24 LEX (GOOD) 1 S 1 view of Hands Obstructed
26:26 LEX (GOOD) 1 R 2 view of Hands Obstructed
26:28 LEX (CANDY) 1 S view of Hands Obstructed
26:37 LEX (WAIT) 1 R view of Hands Obstructed
26:48 LEX (GRAPES) 1 R view of Hands Obstructed
29:28 LEX (BOX) 0 1 R
29:56 LEX (GRAPES) 0 1 R
31:27 LEX (GRAPES) 0 1 S 1
33:01 LEX (BUNNY) 0 1 R
33:16 LEX (GRAPES, GRAPES) 0 1 S
33:24 LEX (GRAPES, BANANA) 2 S 1 view obstructed
33:30 LEX (GRAPES, BANANA) 0 2 S 2
33:37 LEX (M&M) 0 1 S
33:41 LEX (M&M, M&M)- hands occupied 1 B 2 S 1
33:56 LEX (M&M, M&M)- Point, Wave- LEX (M&M, GRAPES) 2 P,B 5 S 2
34:20 LEX (SUGAR, GRAPES, M&M) 0 3 R 3
39:54 inadvertent LEX use
40:15 inadvertent LEX use
41:31 LEX (M&M, BANANA) 0 2 R
41:56 LEX (BANANA) 0 1 R 1
44:28 LEX (BANANA) 0 1 R 2
45:09 LEX (ONION) 0 1 R
46:25 LEX (GRAPES) 0 1 S
50:15 LEX (CHERRIES, BANANA) 0 2 R
50:48 LEX (GRAPES) 0 1 R
50:51 LEX (SURPRISE, BANANA PEANUT) 0 3 R
54:25 LEX (KEY, KEY) 1 B 2 R
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NHK FILE TIME 
starts
UTTERANCE GESTU
RE
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Repetition File Notes
-
-
184
-
71
140
-
-
-
-
-
240
161
138
-
-
152
111
298
272
-
126
48
-
-
-
417
277
310
45
-
-
-
56:33 LEX (PLAYYARD) 1 S View of Hands Obstructed
56:50 LEX (WATER) 1 S view of Hands Obstructed
38:52 LEX (SURPRISE) 0 1 view obstructed
X No Utterances
1:22 LEX (SUGARCANE)- hand sweep 1 I 2 S
1:34 LEX (SUGARCANE, SURPRISE) 0 2 R 1
2:13 LEX (JELLY) - hand sweep? 1 I 2 S
4:26 LEX (M&M)- hand sweep to tummy 1 I 2 S
16:33 LEX (M&M)- hand sweep to tummy then point to person 2 I,P 3 S 1
16:58 LEX (M&M) 0 1 S 2
17:24 LEX (M&M) 0 1 S 3
17:45 LEX (M&M) 1 Unknown 4 tape cuts to lex use
24:50 LEX (M&M) 0 1 S 5
28:39 LEX (BLANKET) 0 1 S
29:21 LEX (BLANKET, COKE) 0 2 Unknown 1 tape cuts to lex use
29:27 LEX (BLANKET) 0 1 S 2
3:21 LEX (GRAPE)- hand wave to face 1 I 2 S
17:40 LEX (BALL) 0 1 S
X KZ not shown
X KZ not shown
Lexigram use prompted as test of receptive competence
7:43 LEX ( BALL, KEY) 2 S
8:08 LEX ( KEY, BALL) 2 S 1 view obstructed
8:40 LEX (GOOD, KEY, BALL OPEN)- POINT 1 P 5 S 2 view obstructed
10:30 LEX- no visual, not counted View obstructed
Remaining tape- Receptive competence task, LEX use not counted
X KZ not shown
9:06 Inadvertent LEX touch
13:00 Inadvertent LEX touch
X KZ not shown
12:36 LEX (UMBRELLA) 0 1 R
13:03 LEX (FOOD FOOD) 1 B 2 R
13:38 LEX (PEANUT) gestures to lexigrams on Shirt- undetermined 0 1 S
X duplicate
X No Utterances
1:56 LEX (STRAWBERRIES) 0 1 S
6:59 LEX (STRAW) hand to mouth LEX (STRAWBERRIES) 1 I 3 S 1
11:51 LEX (STRAWBERRIES) hand to mouth 1 I 2 S 2
13:58 LEX (STRAWBERRIES) hand to mouth 1 I 2 S 3
14:40 LEX (_, _) 1 B 2 S
15:24 LEX (UNKNOWN, UNKNOWN) hand to forehead 1 I 2 S View obstructed
15:37 LEX (AUSTIN) hand to forehead 1 I 2 R
X duplicate
X KZ not shown
X kz= juvenile
10:28 LEX (CELERY) 0 1 S
16:34 LEX (GRAPES, BANANA) 0 2 R
16:58 LEX (KEY) 1 R view of Hands Obstructed
17:55 LEX (BANANA) 0 1 R
18:10 LEX (BANANA) 1 R 1 view of Hands Obstructed
18:17 LEX (MILK) WAVE 1 I 2 S
19:19 LEX (KEY) 0 1 R
19:50 LEX (M&M, BALL) 0 2 R
20:16 asked to repeat LEX (BACKPACK) not counted
0:14 LEX (BALL)- hand wave to self 1 I 2 R
0:24 LEX (HIDE) 0 1 S
1:00 LEX (SUE’S OFFICE) 0 1 R
1:47 Unknown Utterance view obstructed
1:55 LEX (COLLAR)- bring hand to kneck 1 I 2 S
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NHK FILE TIME 
starts
UTTERANCE GESTU
RE
GESTURE 
COMMENT
UTTERA
NCE 
LENGTH
Sponta
neous 
or 
respon
se
Repetition File Notes
-
-
-
383
209
332
404
-
-
-
-
163
-
-
-
-
-
256
-
61
400
224
255
2:07 LEX (GO) 1 R view of Hands Obstructed
2:16 Unknown Utterance view of Hands Obstructed
2:22 LEX (M&M) 1 R view of Hands Obstructed
2:38 LEX (AFRAME) 1 R view of Hands Obstructed
2:43 LEX (M&M, GIVE) 0 2 R
7:30 unknown Utterance S view of Hands Obstructed
13:25 unknown Utterance S view of Hands Obstructed
X KZ not shown
? KZ= juvenile
X KZ not shown
1:41 LEX (BREAD) 0 1 R
4:19 LEX (BREAD) 1 R 1 View of Hands Obstructed
6:35 LEX (BREAD, PEAR)- hand to mouth 1 I 3 S 2
15:44 LEX (FOOD SURPRISE) 0 2 S
24:55 LEX (M&M) 0 1 R
25:04 LEX (SURPRISE, PEAR, M&M, GIVE) 0 4 R 1
28:16 LEX (M&M) 1 S 2 VIew of Hands Obstructed
28:55 LEX (CHASE, HIDE) POINT 1 P 3 S
30:45 LEX (KEY) 0 1 S
2:55 LEX (CHASE) POINT 1 P 2 S
11:35 LEX (M&M, PEAR) POINT, HAND TO MOUTH 2 P 4 S
6:02 LEX (AUSTIN) 0 1 S
6:19 LEX (GRAPES) 0 1 S
7:28 LEX (BANANA) 0 1 S
9:06 LEX (POPSICLE) HAND TO MOUTH 1 I 2 S
12:01 LEX (GRAPES) 1 S
13:06 LEX (PEAR) 0 1 S
5:46 LEX (SUGARCANE) 0 1 S
6:00 LEX (CHOW) 0 1 S
7:46 LEX (UNKNOWN)- POINT 1 P 2 R
8:59 LEX (UNKNOWN) 1 View of Hands Obstructed
9:04 LEX ( 1 View of Hands Obstructed
9:33 LEX (GRAPES?) 1 VIew of Hands Obstructed
9:42 LEX (DOG) 0 1 R VIew of Hands Obstructed
17:23 LEX (APPLE)- naming task R NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
17:30 LEX (APPLE)- naming task R NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
17:42 LEX (APPLE)- naming task R NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
18:10 LEX (ORANGE)- naming task R NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
18:12 LEX (APPLE)- naming task S NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
18:16 LEX (APPLE)- naming task R NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
naming tasks- not counted
20:26 LEX (PEANUT) 0 1 R
21:46 LEX (PEANUT) 0 1 S 1
22:48 LEX (UNKNOWN JUICE BREAD MILK) 0 3 S
23:39 LEX (PEANUT) 0 1 R
24:51 LEX (PEANUT) 0 1 R 1
X No Utterances
X KZ not shown
X Not in archive
2:56 LEX (CHEESE BREAD) 0 2 S
3:26 LEX (BREAD, BITE REPEATED) 1 B 3 R 1
4:17 LEX ( BALL, FOOD,  MELON, MILK BREAD REPEATED) 1 B 6 R 2
4:46 LEX (BREAD) 0 1 R 3
4:52 LEX (BREAD) 0 1 R 4
5:24 LEX (RAISIN) 0 1 S
5:44 LEX (BALL, MILK) 0 2 S
6:30 LEX (MILK) HAND SWEAP LEX (MILK) 1 I 3 R 1
9:06 LEX (YES) 0 1 R
9:10 LEX (YES) DOESN’T COUNT NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
9:56 LEX (SUGAR) 0 1 S
10:45 LEX (CHEERY, KEY) 0 2 S
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NHK FILE TIME 
starts
UTTERANCE GESTU
RE
GESTURE 
COMMENT
UTTERA
NCE 
LENGTH
Sponta
neous 
or 
respon
se
Repetition File Notes
-
-
-
-
32
163
270
-
11:00 LEX (FOOD, SURPRISE) 0 2 S
13:16 LEX (WATERMELON, REPEATED) HAND TO FACE 2 B, I 3
15:53 BANANA- NAMING TASK, NOT COUNTED NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
16:31 BANANA- NAMING TASK, NOT COUNTED NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
16:54 BLUEBERRY- NAMING TASK, NOT COUNTED NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
17:41 SUGAR- NAMING TASK, NOT COUNTED NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
18:13 BUNNY- NAMING TASK, NOT COUNTED NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
18:20 WATERMELON- NAMING TASK, NOT COUNTED NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
18:25 CARRY- NAMING TASK, NOT COUNTED NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
18:27 WATERMELON X2- NAMING TASK, NOT COUNTED NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
18:31 WATERMELON SUGAR 0 2 R View of Hands Obstructed
18:42 CANDY WATERMELON X2 0 2 R 1 View of Hands Obstructed
18:50 WATERMELON CANDY SUGAR REPEATED 1 B 4 R 2
19:01 WATERMELON, HAND TO HEAD 1 I 2 R 3
19:11 CANDY REPEATED, WATERMELON 1 B 3 R 4 VIew of Hands Obstructed
19:20 WATERMELON SUGAR 0 2 R 5 View of Hands Obstructed
19:24 BUNNY X2- NOT COUNTED
19:29 WATERMELON 0 1 S
19:31 WATERMELON CANDY WATERMELON X2 1 B 4 S 1
19:36 CANDY- NOT COUNTED
19:50 WATERMELON CANDY SUGAR WATERMELON X3 1 B 5 R 2
20:20 MILK WATERMELON 0 2 R 3
20:50 SUE BUNNY X2 WATERMELON 1 B 4 R 4
21:36 WATERMELON 0 1 R 5
23:18 BALL KEY- NOT COUNTED KZ not seen
23:57 BALL HAND TO HEAD 1 I 2 R
25:08 TICKLE 1 S
25:43 BALL 1 S
26:07 BEDROOM POINT 1 P 2 R
26:15 TV- NOT COUNTED
26:44 MILK 0 1 S
27:43 MILK 0 1 S 1
27:57 MILK X2 1 B 2 2
29:08 Naming tasks- not counted
31:26 WATER ORANGE PLAYYARD 0 3 S
32:25 TICKLE X2 BITE POINT 2 B, P 4 S
33:13 Naming tasks- not counted
33:44 WATER 0 1 S
34:38 WATER X3, POINT BOUNCE 3 B, P, B 4 S 1
35:06 WATERMELON X2 POINT 2 B, P 3 R 1
35:36 WATERMELON PLAYYARD POINT 1 P 3 R 2
35:44 SUGAR WATERMELON 0 2 S 3
36:16 BALLOON- NOT COUNTED
36:47 BALL 0 1 S
38:04 WATER 0 1 S
39:25 ICE 0 1 R
41:25 WATERMELON HAND TO FACE 1 I 2 S
47:30 ORANGE TOMATO, BEAT 1 B 3 S
51:25 YES 0 1 S
53:40 WATER REPEATED, ORANGE JUICE 1 B 3 S
54:20 WATER ICE 0 2 S 1
54:44 BLANKET WATER 0 2 S 2
56:37 ICE X2 1 B 2 S View of Hands Obstructed
57:36 UNCLEAR
1:01:07 PEANUT RAISIN CHEESE PEANUT 0 4 S
X KZ not shown
X Duplicate
6:50 BANANA 0 1 S
9:00 MILK 0 1 S
10:15 Naming tasks- not counted NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
10:47 SURPRISE 0 1 S VIew of Hands Obstructed
10:53 MILK X2 1 B 2 R
11:13 SURPRISE POINT, HAND TO MOUTH 2 P, I 3 R
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starts
UTTERANCE GESTU
RE
GESTURE 
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UTTERA
NCE 
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Repetition File Notes
-
-
361
342
331
268
-
-
-
-
-
181
SAMPL
E 2
3
103
-
-
115
-
-
-
119
134
139
149
11:34 SURPRISE FOOD 0 2 R 1
13:07 WATER REPEATED 1 B 2 R
13:53 Naming tasks- not counted NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
15:55 ICE WATER REPEATED 1 B 3 S
21:50 Naming tasks- not counted NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
24:48 BANANA 0 1 S
25:39 Naming tasks- not counted NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
27:55 BLUEBERRY 0 1 R
28:50 Naming tasks- not counted NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
32:07 HOTDOG X2 1 B 2 R View of Hands Obstructed
32:50 CHEESE X2 1 B 2 R
32:58 HOTDOG CHEESE 0 2 R 1
35:07 Naming tasks- not counted NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
39:27 GRAPES 0 1 R VIew of Hands Obstructed
X KZ not shown
X KZ not shown
X KZ not shown
14:02 MILK 0 1 S
15:00 BOX WAS BOX WAS 0 4 R REPEATING DISPLAYED LEXIGRAMS
15:10 FIGHT NOODLES 0 2 R REPEATING DISPLAYED LEXIGRAMS
15:13 TV TAPE 0 1 R REPEATING DISPLAYED LEXIGRAMS
15:20 NOT COUNTED REPEATING DISPLAYED LEXIGRAMS
17:30 BOX REPEATED 1 B 2 R
17:38 BOX REPEATED 1 B 2 R 1
39:49 UMBRELLA 0 1 R VIew of Hands Obstructed
40:18 FOOD X3 1 B 2 S
40:30 PEANUT, TOUCHES LEXIGRAMS ON SHIRT REPEATED 2 I, B 3 S
X KZ not shown
random.org
X KZ not shown
3:31 Can’t See Hands- Doesn’t Count View of Hands Obstructed
3:54 BITE 0 1 S
8:30 Unknown Utterance view of Hands Obstructed
34:20 MATATA 0 1 R
34:27 CHESE BREAD 0 2 R
34:40 Unknown Utterance 0 1 S
34:50 Unknown Utterance 0 1 S
4:33 GRAPES 0 1 S
4:40 GRAPES- POINT, HAND TO HEAD, POINT 3 P, I, P 4 S 1
4:58 Unseen + POINT 1 2 S
10:16 VISITORS 0 1 S
18:18 WATER 0 1 S
20:10 BANANA- NAMING TASK, NOT COUNTED R NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
25:46 GRAPES, POINT 1 P 2 R NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
26:07 GRAPES R 1 NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
26:40 GRAPES X3, CEREAL GOOD 1 B 4 S 2 NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
27:12 Unknown Utterance R NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
28:08 Unknown Utterance R NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
34:00 GRAPES, UNCLEAR R NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
34:30 GRAPES, CANDY R NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
40:33 GRAPES R NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
41:33 CELERY R NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
X KZ not shown
X No Utterances
X Duplicate
17:44 Unknown Utterance
17:54 Unknown Utterance
5:16 HAMBURGER 0 1 S
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NHK FILE TIME 
starts
UTTERANCE GESTU
RE
GESTURE 
COMMENT
UTTERA
NCE 
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Repetition File Notes
156
158
192
209
237
261
-
-
-
-
16:19 HAMBURGER 0 1 S 1
  
11:30 inadvertent LEX use, M&M 0 1 S
14:54 M&M 0 1 S 1
15:23 M&M 0 1 S 2
16:30 M&M 0 1 S 3
20:46 Unknown Utterance
21:03 M&M 0 1 R
21:30 HIDE X2, GROUP ROOM 1 B 3 S
X
X KZ not shown
X Duplicate
X KZ= juvenile
5:18 BALL X2, UNCLEAR 1 B 3 S
8:31 HOTDOG X2 1 B 2 R
9:59 SURPRISE 0 1 R
10:33 SURPRISE, HAND BEAT 1 B 2 R 1
10:42 HAMBURGER 0 1 S
11:03 HAMBURGER 0 1 R 1
11:29 HAMBURGER, HAND TO HEAD 1 I 2 R 2
11:41 NOT COUNTED
12:03 TALK, UNKNOWN, BUNNY 0 3 R
12:11 BUNNY 0 1 R 1 VIew of Hands Obstructed
12:53 BALL- POINT 1 P 2 S
13:25 BUNNY 0 1 S
13:46 HAMBURGER 0 1 R
13:51 HIDE 0 1 R
13:56 Unknown Utterance
14:21 M&M 0 1 R
14:30 M&M 0 1 R 1
14:48 BANANA 0 1 S
14:53 BANANA 0 1 R 1
15:13 GRAPES, CLAP 1 I 2 R
15:19 Unknown Utterance
15:36 BALL 0 1 S
15:50 BANANA 0 1 R
15:56 Unknown Utterance
16:05 PLAYYARD 0 1 R
16:19 ONION 0 1 R
16:23 ONION X2 1 B 2 R 1
16:30 Unknown Utterance
16:48 PEANUT 1 R View of Hands Obstructed
16:55 PEANUT, REPEATED 1 B 2 R 1
17:10 GRAPES, ONIONS, UNSEEN, POINT 1 P 4 R
17:30 NOT COUNTED NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
17:50 PEANUT 0 1 R
18:05 NOT COUNTED NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
18:30 BUNNY, CANDY 0 2 R
18:42 NOT COUNTED NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
21:30 UNCLEAR, SURPRISE 0 2 R
22:11 BALL 0 1 S
22:23 WATERMELON, CANDY X2, MARSHMALLOW, P-SUKE, KISS, CANDY 1 B 7 S
23:34 CANDY 0 1 R 1
23:48 Unknown Utterance
24:01 SOME, CANDY 0 2 R
24:07 SOME, POINT, HAND TO MOUTH 2 P, I 3 R 1
24:11 NOT COUNTED NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
24:41 CANDY, TEA SOME X2 1 B 4 S
24:44 SOME X2 1 B 2 R 1
24:52 NOT COUNTED NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
25:19 GRAPES 0 1 R
25:30 Unknown Utterance
26:03 NOT COUNTED NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
26:26 CANDY, WAIT 0 2 R
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starts
UTTERANCE GESTU
RE
GESTURE 
COMMENT
UTTERA
NCE 
LENGTH
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neous 
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se
Repetition File Notes
303
333
337
348
372
413
414
LRC 
FILE
EXAMP
LE
306
2293
2297
3862
4313
176
436
3666
1778
344
3848
4742
3665
2897
4762
2958
327
492
4782
408
1364
101
317
3578
4792
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
3062
27:55 SHIRT, BALL 0 2 R
28:54 BANANA 0 1 S
30:13 GRAPES, GOOD, GRAPES, CANDY, WATERMELON, CANDY, WATERMELON0 7 R
30:58 BALL 0 1 S
31:31 NOT COUNTED NAMING/TESTING SITUATION
34:10 Unknown Utterance
34:21 MILK 0 1 R
38:40 Unknown Utterance VIew of Hands Obstructed
X KZ= juvenile
X KZ not shown
X KZ not shown
X KZ not shown
X KZ not shown
X KZ not shown
X KZ not shown
TIME 
starts
UTTERANCE GES
TUR
E
GESTURE 
COMMEN
T
UTTE
RANC
E 
LENG
TH
Spo
ntan
eous 
or 
resp
onse
Repetitio
n
File Notes
1:00 LEX(CHASE)-POINT 1 P 2 Example
X KZ not Shown
X KZ pre-Adult
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X Not in Archive
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ pre-Adult
X KZ not Shown
X Not in Archive
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X Not in Archive
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
5:02- LEX (BALL)- 0 1 SPONTANEOUSView of Hands blocked
9:42- LEX (BALL)- 0 1 RESPONSE 1 View of Hands blocked
15:27- LEX (UNKNOWN) 0 1 SPONTANEOUSPlaying piano
15:42- LEX (BALL)- 0 1 SPONTANEOUSPlaying piano
16:01- LEX(SURPRISE) 0 1 RESPONSE Playing piano
16:27- LEX (BANANA) 0 1 SPONTANEOUSPlaying piano
16:43- LEX(SURPRISE) 0 1 SPONTANEOUSView of Hands blocked
17:08- LEX (UNKNOWN) 0 1 SPONTANEOUSVIew of Hands blocked
28:01- LEX (BANANA) HEAD TOUCH LEX (BANANA) 1 I 3 SPONTANEOUSPlaying piano
28:10- LEX (BANANA) TOUCH PIANO, LEX (BANANA) 0 2 SPONTANEOUS1 Playing piano
29:13- LEX (UNKNOWN) HAND TO MOUTH 1 I 2 SPONTANEOUSPLaying piano
30:33- LEX (UNKNOWN) 0 1 SPONTANEOUS
31:05- LEX (UNKNOWN) X2 1 B 2 SPONTANEOUS
41:28- LEX(A FRAME) HEAD TOUCH 1 I 2 SPONTANEOUS
41:56- LEX (UNKNOWN) X3 1 B 2 SPONTANEOUS
42:10- LEX (UNKNOWN) 1 SPONTANEOUS
X KZ not Shown
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NHK FILE TIME 
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UTTERANCE GESTU
RE
GESTURE 
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UTTERA
NCE 
LENGTH
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Repetition File Notes
809
2782
2545
879
1101
2628
3926
1639
444
1455
282
2452
1652
182
968
2517
3608
279
926
3107
2972
1023
4591
2724
SAMPL
E 2
3070
3240
3262
3347
3353
3479
3510
-
-
3527
3625
3678
3684
3694
3789
3869
3876
3928
3939
4029
4062
4066
4084
4255
4264
4315
4376
-
4563
4571
4643
4821
4800
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ pre-Adult
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ pre-Adult
X Kz not Shown
X KZ pre-Adult
X KZ pre-Adult
X Not in Archive
X KZ pre-Adult
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ pre-Adult
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X Not in Archive
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
from 3000-4929, random.org
X not in Archive
X not in Archive
X No Utterances- tool use
X KZ not Shown- NuMath
X KZ not Shown- NuMath
X KZ not Shown
0:33- LEX(BLACKBERRY) 1 SPONTANEOUSview of Hands blocked
1:03- LEX(BLACKBERRY) 1 SPONTANEOUS1 view of Hands blocked
X not in Archive
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown- NuMath
X KZ not Shown- NuMath
X not in Archive
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X not in Archive
0:51- LEX(KEY OPEN KEY PLAYYARD) 0 4 RESPONSE
X Not in Archive
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
11:56- Unknown View of Hands blocked
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X KZ not Shown
X Edited Documentary
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APPENDIX 2- STATISTICAL OUTPUT
Experiment 1
Frequencies
Notes
Output Created 23-Feb-2012 14:02:20
Comments  
Input Data F:\Daniel Musgrave 022312.sav
Active Dataset DataSet0
Filter <none>
Weight <none>
Split File <none>
N of Rows in Working Data File 336
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing.
Cases Used Statistics are based on all cases with valid 
data.
Syntax FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=Clive Daniel 
added
  /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.016
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.003
[DataSet0] F:\Daniel Musgrave 022312.sav
Statistics
Clive Daniel added
N Valid 336 336 336
Missing 0 0 0
129
Frequency Table
Clive
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent
Valid 1 241 71.7 71.7 71.7
2 60 17.9 17.9 89.6
3 20 6.0 6.0 95.5
4 9 2.7 2.7 98.2
5 3 0.9 0.9 99.1
6 2 0.6 0.6 99.7
7 1 0.3 0.3 100.0
Total 336 100.0 100.0
Daniel
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent
Valid 1 166 49.4 49.4 49.4
2 107 31.8 31.8 81.3
3 33 9.8 9.8 91.1
4 19 5.7 5.7 96.7
5 5 1.5 1.5 98.2
6 3 0.9 0.9 99.1
7 2 0.6 0.6 99.7
8 1 0.3 0.3 100.0
Total 336 100.0 100.0
added
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent
Valid 0 226 67.3 67.3 67.3
1 96 28.6 28.6 95.8
2 11 3.3 3.3 99.1
3 2 0.6 0.6 99.7
5 1 0.3 0.3 100.0
Total 336 100.0 100.0
T-TEST
  /TESTVAL=1.15
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS
  /VARIABLES=Clive Daniel
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95).
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T-Test
Notes
Output Created 23-Feb-2012 14:05:29
Comments  
Input Data F:\Daniel Musgrave 022312.sav
Active Dataset DataSet0
Filter <none>
Weight <none>
Split File <none>
N of Rows in Working Data File 336
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User defined missing values are treated as 
missing.
Cases Used Statistics for each analysis are based on the 
cases with no missing or out-of-range data for 
any variable in the analysis.
Syntax T-TEST
  /TESTVAL=1.15
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS
  /VARIABLES=Clive Daniel
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95).
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.000
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.019
[DataSet0] F:\Daniel Musgrave 022312.sav
One-Sample Statistics
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Clive 336 1.46 0.920 0.050
Daniel 336 1.85 1.154 0.063
One-Sample Test
Test Value = 1.15                
t df Sig. (2-
tailed)
Mean 
Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
Clive 6.203 335 0.000 0.311 0.21 0.41
Daniel 11.045 335 0.000 0.695 0.57 0.82
T-TEST PAIRS=Daniel WITH Clive (PAIRED)
  /CRITERIA=CI(.9500)
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS.
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T-Test
Notes
Output Created 23-Feb-2012 14:08:46
Comments  
Input Data F:\Daniel Musgrave 022312.sav
Active Dataset DataSet0
Filter <none>
Weight <none>
Split File <none>
N of Rows in Working Data File 336
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User defined missing values are treated as 
missing.
Cases Used Statistics for each analysis are based on the 
cases with no missing or out-of-range data for 
any variable in the analysis.
Syntax T-TEST PAIRS=Daniel WITH Clive (PAIRED)
  /CRITERIA=CI(.9500)
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS.
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.000
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.005
[DataSet0] F:\Daniel Musgrave 022312.sav
Paired Samples Statistics
Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
Pair 1 Daniel 1.85 336 1.154 0.063
Clive 1.46 336 0.920 0.050
Paired Samples Correlations
N Correlation Sig.
Pair 1 Daniel & Clive 336 0.838 0.000
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Paired Samples Test
Paired Differences
Mean Std. 
Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference
Lower Upper
Pair 1 Daniel - Clive 0.384 0.631 0.034 0.316 0.452
Paired Samples Test
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
Pair 1 Daniel - Clive 11.149 335 0.000
T-TEST GROUPS=group(1 2)
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS
  /VARIABLES=responsesspontaneous
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95).
Experiment 2
T-Test
Notes
Output Created 23-Feb-2012 14:23:02
Comments  
Input Data F:\Daniel Musgrave 022312.sav
Active Dataset DataSet0
Filter <none>
Weight <none>
Split File <none>
N of Rows in Working Data File 336
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User defined missing values are treated as 
missing.
Cases Used Statistics for each analysis are based on the 
cases with no missing or out-of-range data for 
any variable in the analysis.
Syntax T-TEST GROUPS=group(1 2)
  /MISSING=ANALYSIS
  /VARIABLES=responsesspontaneous
  /CRITERIA=CI(.95).
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.016
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.010
[DataSet0] F:\Daniel Musgrave 022312.sav
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Group Statistics
group N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
responsesspontaneous responses 157 1.93 1.220 0.097
spontaneous 162 1.81 1.123 0.088
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances
F Sig.
responsesspontaneous Equal variances assumed 0.045 0.832
Equal variances not assumed
Independent Samples Test
t-test for Equality of Means
t df Sig. (2-tailed)
responsesspontaneous Equal variances assumed 0.924 317 0.356
Equal variances not assumed 0.923 312.932 0.357
Independent Samples Test
t-test for Equality of Means
Mean Difference Std. Error Difference
responsesspontaneous Equal variances assumed 0.121 0.131
Equal variances not assumed 0.121 0.131
Independent Samples Test
t-test for Equality of Means
95% Confidence Interval of the Difference
Lower Upper
responsesspontaneous Equal variances assumed -0.137 0.379
Equal variances not assumed -0.137 0.380
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Frequencies
Notes
Output Created 23-Feb-2012 14:43:30
Comments  
Input Data F:\Daniel Musgrave 022312.sav
Active Dataset DataSet0
Filter <none>
Weight <none>
Split File <none>
N of Rows in Working Data File 336
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing.
Cases Used Statistics are based on all cases with valid 
data.
Syntax FREQUENCIES VARIABLES=grouprepeat
  /ORDER=ANALYSIS.
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.000
Elapsed Time 00:00:00.005
[DataSet0] F:\Daniel Musgrave 022312.sav
Statistics
grouprepeat
N Valid 334
Missing 2
grouprepeat
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative 
Percent
Valid No repeats 236 70.2 70.7 70.7
1 repeat 60 17.9 18.0 88.6
2 repeats 22 6.5 6.6 95.2
3 or more repeats 16 4.8 4.8 100.0
Total 334 99.4 100.0
Missing System 2 0.6
Total 336 100.0
ONEWAY repeats BY grouprepeat
  /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES HOMOGENEITY BROWNFORSYTHE WELCH
  /PLOT MEANS
  /MISSING ANALYSIS
  /POSTHOC=BONFERRONI GH ALPHA(0.05).
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Experiment 3
Oneway
Notes
Output Created 23-Feb-2012 14:45:43
Comments  
Input Data F:\Daniel Musgrave 022312.sav
Active Dataset DataSet0
Filter <none>
Weight <none>
Split File <none>
N of Rows in Working Data File 336
Missing Value Handling Definition of Missing User-defined missing values are treated as 
missing.
Cases Used Statistics for each analysis are based on 
cases with no missing data for any variable in 
the analysis.
Syntax ONEWAY repeats BY grouprepeat
  /STATISTICS DESCRIPTIVES 
HOMOGENEITY BROWNFORSYTHE 
WELCH
  /PLOT MEANS
  /MISSING ANALYSIS
  /POSTHOC=BONFERRONI GH 
ALPHA(0.05).
Resources Processor Time 00:00:00.843
Elapsed Time 00:00:01.439
[DataSet0] F:\Daniel Musgrave 022312.sav
Descriptives
repeats
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval for 
Mean
Lower Bound Upper Bound
No repeats 236 1.76 1.147 0.075 1.61 1.91
1 repeat 60 1.98 0.965 0.125 1.73 2.23
2 repeats 22 2.55 1.595 0.340 1.84 3.25
3 or more repeats 16 1.75 0.931 0.233 1.25 2.25
Total 334 1.85 1.155 0.063 1.73 1.97
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Descriptives
repeats
Minimum Maximum
No repeats 1 8
1 repeat 1 4
2 repeats 1 6
3 or more repeats 1 4
Total 1 8
Test of Homogeneity of Variances
repeats
Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig.
3.608 3 330 0.014
ANOVA
repeats
Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig.
Between Groups 13.844 3 4.615 3.536 0.015
Within Groups 430.671 330 1.305
Total 444.515 333
Robust Tests of Equality of Means
repeats
Statistica df1 df2 Sig.
Welch 2.253 3 44.307 0.095
Brown-Forsythe 3.180 3 58.289 0.031
a. Asymptotically F distributed.
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Post Hoc Tests
Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable:repeats
(I) grouprepeat (J) grouprepeat Mean Difference 
(I-J)
Std. Error Sig.
Bonferroni No repeats 1 repeat -0.225 0.165 1.000
2 repeats -.787* 0.255 0.013
3 or more repeats 0.008 0.295 1.000
1 repeat No repeats 0.225 0.165 1.000
2 repeats -0.562 0.285 0.295
3 or more repeats 0.233 0.321 1.000
2 repeats No repeats .787* 0.255 0.013
1 repeat 0.562 0.285 0.295
3 or more repeats 0.795 0.375 0.209
3 or more repeats No repeats -0.008 0.295 1.000
1 repeat -0.233 0.321 1.000
2 repeats -0.795 0.375 0.209
Games-Howell No repeats 1 repeat -0.225 0.145 0.413
2 repeats -0.787 0.348 0.137
3 or more repeats 0.008 0.244 1.000
1 repeat No repeats 0.225 0.145 0.413
2 repeats -0.562 0.362 0.422
3 or more repeats 0.233 0.264 0.813
2 repeats No repeats 0.787 0.348 0.137
1 repeat 0.562 0.362 0.422
3 or more repeats 0.795 0.412 0.235
3 or more repeats No repeats -0.008 0.244 1.000
1 repeat -0.233 0.264 0.813
2 repeats -0.795 0.412 0.235
*. The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.
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Multiple Comparisons
Dependent Variable:repeats
(I) grouprepeat (J) grouprepeat 95% Confidence Interval
Lower Bound Upper Bound
Bonferroni No repeats 1 repeat -0.66 0.21
2 repeats -1.46 -0.11
3 or more repeats -0.77 0.79
1 repeat No repeats -0.21 0.66
2 repeats -1.32 0.19
3 or more repeats -0.62 1.09
2 repeats No repeats 0.11 1.46
1 repeat -0.19 1.32
3 or more repeats -0.20 1.79
3 or more repeats No repeats -0.79 0.77
1 repeat -1.09 0.62
2 repeats -1.79 0.20
Games-Howell No repeats 1 repeat -0.60 0.15
2 repeats -1.75 0.18
3 or more repeats -0.68 0.70
1 repeat No repeats -0.15 0.60
2 repeats -1.55 0.43
3 or more repeats -0.49 0.96
2 repeats No repeats -0.18 1.75
1 repeat -0.43 1.55
3 or more repeats -0.32 1.91
3 or more repeats No repeats -0.70 0.68
1 repeat -0.96 0.49
2 repeats -1.91 0.32
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